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Abstract
Historically, incumbent assembly firms with unquestionable strong positions in such
industries as the automobile, consumer electronics, computer and mobile phone industries,
have lost power when new technology is introduced; at the same time, supplier firms have
taken over the power and gained value in the industry. We characterize this phenomenon as
value-shift. Many industry experts have intuitive understandings of this phenomenon but not
many scholars have identified its mechanism with a full-fledged theory. This paper identifies a
mechanism that causes value-shift within the TV set industry, suggesting its application to other
industries. This thesis then proposes a clear spectrum of strategies for incumbent assembly
firms to prevent value-shift. At the same time, it indicates a set of strategies for supplier firms
to take over the industry leadership.
The work firstly defines value-shift and presents evidences that it exists in various
industries by calculating the transition of value-added. By quantifying the impact of the value-
shift with this calculation, the thesis urges incumbent firms to take immediate actions to defy
the value-shift. Then the thesis closely examines recent technology transition from the Cathode
Ray Tube to the Liquid Crystal Display and describes how the value-shift took place in the TV set
industry. From this industry analysis, the thesis describes the mechanism of the value-shift and
discussed the possible strategies that incumbent firms could use to maintain their power over
the industry. Finally, the thesis suggests the generalized mechanism of value-shift as an
evolution in four stages using the modularity theory. The thesis implies the proposed
mechanism is generally applicable by citing examples from other industries and suggests
possible actions for both parties: for the incumbent firms to defy the value-shift and for the
supplier firms to obtain industry leadership.
Thesis Advisor: James M. Utterback
David J. McGrath Jr (1959) Professor of Management and Innovation and
Professor of Engineering Systems MIT Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Incumbent Assembly Firms Often Replaced by Suppliers
with New Technologies - Scope of the Thesis
Historically, in assembly industries such as the automobile, consumer electronics,
computer and mobile phone industries, incumbent assembly firms have built the industry from
the ground up. To provide final products from scratch, these firms have developed new
technologies or sourced necessary technologies from outside; they have established supply
chains for components; they have coordinated the development and production with outside
firms; they have built distribution channels to deliver the final products to customers. In short,
incumbent assembly firms have established the industry value chain - the chain of the value-
adding activities to provide final products. Therefore, those firms tend to have a strong power
and control over the entire industry. However, incumbent assembly firms have often failed
when facing the emergence of new technologies. Such firms have often been replaced by other
players in the value chain or by new entrants that bring new technologies to the industry.
Two major players have been replacing incumbent firms (Figure 1.1). First, incumbent
assemblers are often replaced by new assemblers that totally replace the product with a new
technology. For example, Kodak was the most notable assembler of portable cameras but it
was replaced by Canon and Nikon, who offered digital still cameras that totally changed the
product architecture. Another example is photolithographic aligners in semiconductor
fabrication, as discussed by Henderson and Clark'. The assembly firms always had been always
substituted by new type of assemblers with new technologies for the five generations.
1 Rebecca M. Henderson and Kim B. Clark (1990)
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Incumbent assembler firms can be replaced by two sources:
new assemblers and supplier firms
Scope of this thesis
Defenders Attackers Example
Typel: New assemblers - Cameras - portable
that have new digital still cameras
technologies and new * Photolithographic
product architecture with aligners
new value-network - Electronic calculators
Incumbent assembler _ Ballpoint pens
firms that have established
technologies and value-
network
-PCsandType2. Supplier firms that
have new key component mTcrT-LcD
technologies and ices - Electric typewriters
their power in the same - Electric vehicles
value-network - Analog and digital
mobile phones
Source: James M. Utterback (1994); Cooper and Smith (1992); Henderson and Clark (1990)
Figure 1.1: Scope of Thesis
Incumbent assemblers are also frequently replaced by suppliers. For instance, IBM
dominated the computer industry until the 1980s, when the ruling position was taken over by
key component suppliers such as Intel and Microsoft. Sony and Panasonic (formerly
Matsushita) were the two strongest assemblers in the CRT TV set industry, but they were
gradually replaced by Samsung, LG, and Sharp, who owned the LCD panel components. The
details of the TV industry case are discussed in Chapter 3.
The scope of this thesis is the latter case: incumbent assemblers being replaced by
suppliers. In this type of industry change, an incumbent assembly firm gradually loses its
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controlling power over the value chain, and a supplier firm that has the key strategic
component of the product gains the value in the industry. In other words, the value shifts from
incumbent assemblers to supplier firms. This thesis characterizes this phenomenon as a value-
shift, clarifies the mechanism behind it, and suggests a set of strategies to incumbent
assemblers to resist this phenomenon. The thesis also suggests strategies for supplier firms to
take over the industry leadership from assemblers.
1.2 Literature Review: Why Do We Need a New Theory for
Losing Incumbents Face with New Technologies?
The question of why incumbent firms can fail when new technologies emerge has been
generally discussed by business scholars for more than two decades. In this section, I review
several theories that had a major impact on this field and explain why I believe that we need a
new theory to explain the failure of incumbent firms.
First several theories, although very convincing, do not separate assembly and non-
assembly products, nor distinguish between type 1 (replaced by new assemblers) and type 2
(replaced by suppliers) as suggested in Figure 1.1.
Foster (1986)2 described these industry changes with an S-curve and argued that new
technologies often start with lower performance than established technologies (Figure 1.2).
Therefore, incumbent firms tend to hesitate to shift to new technologies and decide instead to
improve old technologies. At the same time, attackers have the advantage of investing in new
technologies because they do not have assets associated with old technologies. Finally, the
performance of the new technologies surpasses that of the old technologies; as a result,
attackers offering new technologies replace the incumbent firms. Foster also pointed out the
2 Richard N. Foster (1986)
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dilemmas of the incumbent firms and argued that they can strike back by investing in
alternative new technologies to replace the new ones and creating a separated organization for
the new technologies from original one for old technologies to avoid internal conflict.
Performance
Discontinuities
Effot
Figure 1.2: S-Curve and Technological Discontinuities
The same year, Tushman and Anderson (1986)3 investigated three different industries
and claimed that incumbents often lose in the face of new technologies not only because
discontinuities exist between old and new technologies but also because the new technologies
are often competence-destroying for the incumbent firms. The question that whether the new
technology is competence-destroying and competence-enhancing leads to a different impact on
incumbent firms.
Cooper and Smith (1992) observed incumbent firms' problems more carefully and
added other strategic reasons that they fail when up against new technologies: 1) Incumbent
firms have new technologies but they release products too early with incomplete technologies;
2) They make smaller commitments to new technologies in the early stages of product
3 Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson (1986)
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development; 3) They keep the same organization as with the old technologies; 4) They use the
same strategy and business model as with the old technologies. Their argument illustrates the
essences of incumbent firms' strategic problems that were later discussed by Christensen and
other scholars in 1990s. Christensen enhanced Cooper and Smith's argument with his close
investigation into the disk drive industry.
In the 1990s, scholars started to distinguish between assembly and non-assembly
products and their focus shifted more to the assembly products category. However, their
argument was mostly limited to cases where incumbent assemblers were replaced by new
assemblers (type 1 in Figure 1.1), with the exception of Utterback (1994)
Utterback (1994) 4 clearly distinguished between assembly and non-assembly products
and showed that incumbent assembler firms have lower track record of surviving in the new
technologies than non-assembling incumbent firms. In addition to the axis of 1) competence-
destroying and competence-enhancing suggested by Tushman and Anderson, 2) the axis of
assembled products or non-assembled products and 3) that of substituting or market
broadening are determining the survival rate of incumbent firms. He argued that when the
technology is more competence-destroying, more assembled, and more substituting, the
survival rate of incumbent firms is lower in face of the new technologies. Utterback did not
make a clear distinction between type 1 and type 2 case (see Figure 1.1), although his
investigation refers to the cases where supplier firms with new component technologies took
over the industry leadership from incumbent firms, such as electric typewriters and Eastman's
system at Eastman-Kodak.
Henderson and Clark (1990) focused on the replacement of incumbent assemblers with
new assemblers with new technologies (type 1 in Figure 1.1) and argued that this phenomenon
4 James M. Utterback (1994)
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occurs when the innovation is an architectural innovation (Figure 1.3). Drawing on Abernathy
and Utterback's discussions, they argued that as the dominant design of a product becomes
crystallized and architectural knowledge becomes stable, the architectural knowledge tends to
become embedded in the organization of the assembler firms, such as communication channels,
practices and procedures. Therefore, those incumbent assembler firms do not come up with
innovations that completely change the embodied architectural knowledge.
Core Concept
Reinforced
UnchangedU 0
* E
E
0 C
4.,
0 Changed
U
Overturned
Figure 1.3: Henderson and Clark's Framework for Architectural Innovation
However, a modular innovation can also have a fatal impact on incumbents as I discuss
in chapter 3 of this thesis. Most of the value-added to final products is added by incumbent
assemblers; however, as the key component was taken by supplier firms through the
introduction of new key component technology (i.e., modular innovation) the value is taken by
the supplier firms. This value-shift deprives incumbent firms not only of their ability of
maintaining current cost structure but also of their industry leadership.
William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback (1978)
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Incremental Modular
Innovation Innovation
Architectural Radical
Innovation Innovation
................... 
Henderson and Clark's idea was articulated more clearly and expanded industry-wise by
Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995)6: they called the relations among suppliers, assemblers,
distributors, and customers a value network and argued that the value network is crystallized
along with the architectural knowledge when the dominant design crystallizes. Christensen
(1995)7 further argued that disruptive technologies that disrupt the incumbent firms'
competence come with a new value-network with a new set of suppliers, business relations,
and new customers. Therefore, incumbent firms that comfortably live in the value-network of
old technologies are not aware of and tend to ignore such disruptive technologies.
Christensen (1997) also enhanced Cooper and Smith's argument with his concept of
innovators' dilemma, which emerged from his detailed investigation of the disk drive industry.
Christensen suggested that incumbent firms should establish a separate organization for
disruptive technologies. In addition to Cooper and Smith's point that the new technologies
generally require different strategy and business models, he added other two reasons that
incumbent firms should institute a separate organization: 1) The market for disruptive
technologies is generally small, so it does not make sense for large incumbent firms to invest
heavily in the new technologies that threaten their old technologies base. However, if the firm
creates a small new company focusing only on the new technologies, the size of the new
market does not matter; 2) as discussed above, customers for disruptive technologies are
different from those of the incumbent firms, so the firms tend to ignore the effect of disruptive
technologies. By creating a separate organizational unit for new disruptive technologies, the
new firm can focus on the right customer and right technologies.
Although Christensen's argument is compelling and applicable to many different cases,
it is limited to cases where new technologies totally replace the value chain or value network.
6 Clayton M. Christensen and Richard S. Rosenbloom (1995)
Clayton M. Christensen (1997)
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However, when suppliers with a new component technology take over the power of incumbent
assemblers, this occurs as the value-shift in the same value-chain. Nevertheless, as I discussed
above, value-shift has a significant negative impact on incumbent assemblers. This
phenomenon is often seen in various industries, but as shown in this section, not many scholars
have explained this concept clearly and its mechanism has not been clearly elucidated.
In summary, most of the theories offered by business scholars are generally fitted to any
industry and any case. The theories proposed in the 1990s focus on assembly products, but
their focus is more on type 1 case in Figure 1.1: the replacement of incumbent assemblers by
new assemblers with different value-network. Few theories suggest the technological changes
that occur in the same value chain can have a fatal impact on incumbent firms - value-Shift.
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to offer theoretical foundation of value-shift and to
describe its mechanism using examples from various industries.
It is also important to urge incumbent firms at risk to take immediate actions to defy the
value-shift. I do so by illustrating how incumbent assembly firms' values are being ripped off by
suppliers in the same value chain and how it becomes difficult for them to maintain their
current lucrative organizational structures.
1.3 Initial Evidence of Value-shift
In this section, I show several examples that illustrating the concept of value shift.
These examples are drawn from textbooks, Sloan MBA courses, and discussions with team
members in those courses. Those are valuable sources for developing the concept of value-shift.
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1.3.1 TV set industry: CRT assemblers lose value; LCD panel suppliers gain
value
Since commercialized in 1941, Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) had been the dominant
technology in the TV set industry for about 60 years. Although there was a substitution of top
U.S. assemblers by European and Japanese players8, it was always the assemblers who added
the biggest share of the total value in the industry by owning key technologies for the
production of TV sets. The industry was largely vertically integrated and more than 65% of the
total value-added came from by assemblers (see Figure 1.3). The lucrative gross margin enabled
CRT assemblers to invest significantly on their R&D activities. This situation allowed the
incumbent assemblers to lead the development and maintenance of the entire product
architecture and to ensure that components supplier followed the requirements of the
assemblers. CRT assemblers were the technology leaders in the TV set industry.
However, with the emergence of flat panel displays in the late 1990s, especially since
Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) became the dominant design in this industry in the early 2000s, the
situation has changed. The industry structure has become clearly more horizontally divided and
newly emerged LCD panel suppliers have become the ones who add the biggest value to the
industry (Figure 1.3). The incumbent CRT TV assemblers - now flat TV assemblers, such as
Toshiba, Sony, Panasonic (LCD) and Philips, could no longer enjoy the high gross margin. Only
the top few LCD panel suppliers, such as Sharp and Samsung, could gain high margins from their
panel businesses, maintain their large R&D investment, and lead the industry standard. This
standard is called "Global Industry Standard Panels" and is followed by smaller panel suppliers.
At present, the source of the value-added and technology leadership has clearly shifted to the
top LCD panel suppliers.
8 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (2001)
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Total value-added by assemblers was significantly reduced in LCD
technology. Panel suppliers became the strongest
Distributors Distributors
Assemblers
Component
Suppliers
6 -5
30% Assemblers
60%. Panel Suppliers
Component Suppliers
CRT LCD
Industry
Leadership Assemblers Panel Suppliers
Key success High R&D investment and Global panel procurement
factors for local customization and thin operation
assemblers* (= high overhead cost)
Source: Expert interview; USITC "Industry and Trade Summary - Television Picture Tubes and Other Cathode Ray Tubes'
(1995); Display Search (2008); DWS Display
Figure 1.4: The Share of Value-Added in the TV Value Chain
I originally conceived the idea of value-shift from this TV set example, which I
investigated in the class project in 15.365 Disruptive Technologies - Predators and Prey. Our
team focused on the technological transitions in the TV industry. Later I chose this industry to
investigate in detail to clarify the mechanism of value-shift. This research is described in
chapter 3.
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1.3.2 PC industry: PC assemblers lose value; microprocessor and OS
suppliers gain value
When personal computers (PC) were developed at a small IBM subsidiary in Florida in
1981, IBM tried totally new product architecture. IBM outsourced the design of most of its
major components to non-IBM manufacturers, which was an unusual action for this heavily-
vertically-integrated company9. The microprocessors were from Intel and the operating system
was from Microsoft. Through this strategic outsourcing, IBM did not need to wait long to gain
expertise and could launch a new product only 15 month after development'0 . This decision
enabled IBM to secure the industry leadership position (its market share was 50% in 1985) and
gain hefty profits from the product. IBM, together with Compaq, was the value chain
orchestrator who decided all the architectures and roles of suppliers, thus maintaining strong
bargaining power until the late 1980s.
However, frustrated with the slow platform evolution and frequent changes required by
the assemblers, Intel developed the PCI bus system and distributed within the industry through
its aggressive collaboration with other players". Then Intel replaced PC-AT bus that ruled the
old architecture developed by IBM. IBM's slow movement allowed Intel to take over the
architectural leadership. Together with Microsoft, Intel has become an industry orchestrator
who decides the pace of technology evolution in the industry and takes the biggest value-added
with the highest profit margins in entire industry value chain'. PC assemblers have lost their
technology leadership and therefore they have also lost their source of the value-added. This is
another example of the value-shift.
9 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (2001)
10 Peter L. Grant (2000)
1 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002)
12 Intel's profit margins in typical years are 20-30%
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I developed this idea mainly from Gawer and Cusumano (2002) and the discussions with
Professor Cusumano at MIT Sloan School. I used this industry example to describe the supplier's
strategic movement to take over the industry leadership from incumbent assemblers. A
detailed discussion of this phenomenon is provided in Chapter 4.
1.3.3 Mobile handset industry: Mobile assemblers lose value; chip and
application software suppliers gain value
Since Motorola's invention of analog mobile handsets in 1983, the company has
13successfully maintained an undisputed position until 1993 . Motorola was a vertically
integrated assembler and its intellectual properties were protected. Therefore there were high
entry barriers for new entrants; new entrants had to develop an entire range of technologies,
from radio signal technologies to semiconductors. Motorola also had a strong brand in the
pager business and long-term exclusive contracts with service operators. The dominant position
in analog handset industry enabled Motorola to gain a lucrative profit margin and control over
the whole value chain.
However, the next generation digital mobile handset technologies - 2G and 3G -
required totally different game rules. It became common for handset assemblers to purchase
the chipsets and key components from outside suppliers. At the same time, the pressure to
lower handset prices and increasing costs of chip and software made it difficult for assemblers
to maintain the same level of large margins the company enjoyed with analog handset. The
industry average gross margin fell significantly. On the other hand, mobile chip vendors, such as
Qualcomm, gained larger margins than assemblers because they owned key technologies and
had a dominant share in the total mobile patent pool' 4 . Therefore, the value shifted from
13 Nabil Al-Najjar and David Besanko (2004)
14 Discussion with the expert in the mobile industry
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incumbent assemblers such as Motorola to chipset or application suppliers. The mobile industry
clearly shows a value-shift from vertically integrated assemblers to component suppliers.
There are several reasons that Motorola lost leadership in the 2G and 3G mobile
handset, but one of the most significant reasons is that it did not notice this industry change
and tried to maintain the costly vertically integrated operation. For example, the development
cost of the mobile software ballooned due to the increasing complexity of handling several ICs
and increasing need for better user interface. Therefore, it became common for handset
assemblers to develop an industry standard OS to reduce total development cost. Several
handset assemblers, including Nokia and Sony Ericsson, co-developed an open industry
platform, Symbian OS. In this common platform, assemblers could modify the system and
differentiate themselves by offering unique user interfaces built upon a common platform at a
minimum cost. On the other hand, Motorola developed its own embedded software on its own
chip, which required significantly high overhead costs for keep highly-skilled embedded
software engineers in-house. Motorola's actions entailed a much higher total cost than industry
average; therefore, it lost its price competitiveness. Motorola finally made a huge loss in the
mobile handset business and ended up laying-off significant number of engineers.
These observations are mostly derived from the team project in 15.912 Technology
Strategy and from discussions with two team members from telecom industry.
1.3.4 Automotive industry: Car assemblers lose value; electronics
suppliers gain value
In the automotive industry, the design and production of electronics parts and software
were traditionally separated and delegated to tier 1 suppliers (such as Denso and Bosch) so that
car assemblers could focus on the overall design and assembly. Traditionally, all the inputs from
the accelerator, handle and brake pedals were transmitted mechanically to the output;
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therefore the key components were those mechanical parts. However, the electronics parts
and software have become more and more important in maintaining the total product quality.
Inputs from the accelerator, handle, and brake pedals are calculated by software and controlled
electronically; for example, the software calculates how a car should use its engine to be most
fuel-efficient, and this information is transmitted electronically to the engine. Therefore,
automotive electronics and software have become the key components in determining overall
product performance and have become more valuable in the total car architecture.
This shift of values from mechanical parts to electronic parts and software automatically
causes a value-shift from the car assemblers (OEMs) to the electronics parts suppliers.
According to McKinsey and Company's studies in 200615, the average car assembler's total
value-added is estimated to drop from around 35% of the total car value in 2006 to 25% in 2015
(see Figure 1.4). Moreover, car assemblers do not possess the technology or the expertise of
automotive electronics and software, so their power to control the suppliers will decrease.
100% -
80%
60%
40% -a Suppliers
20% 
OEM
20%
2006 2015
Figure 1.5: Change in the share of value-added by OEMs (Numbers in percentage)
It is worth noting that Toyota could manage supplier's bargaining power and maintained
control over the whole value chain, even they had traditionally outsourced around 70% of the
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total value-added to suppliers16. But even for Toyota, it is becoming difficult to maintain
bargaining power over the electronics suppliers such as Denso. The author estimates that the
value-shift will be more obvious and significant within the hybrid car and electric vehicles (EV).
Toyota is now combating this shift by absorbing technologies from suppliers; however it is not
clear whether Toyota can continue this same strategy with EVs.
1.4 Thesis Structure
As this chapter has shown, we observe value-shift - the phenomenon that incumbent
assembly firms lose power when new technology is introduced and supplier firms take over the
power and gain value in the same value chain - in many assembly industries. However, not
many business scholars have identified its mechanism with a full-fledged theory. In this thesis, I
identify the mechanism that causes value-shift within the TV set industry and suggest its
application to other industries. Then I propose a set of strategies for incumbent assembly firms
to prevent the value-shift and for supplier firms to take over industry leadership from
incumbent assemblers.
Chapter 2 redefines the concept of value chain used in this thesis to illustrate value-shift
quantitatively and more clearly; I use the simplified expression of value chain, omitting less
significant parts and integrating several activities. Then I define the value-added in the industry
using accounting terms and calculate the value-added in the automotive industry as an example.
By calculating the transition of value-added, I quantify the impact of value-shift clearly. Finally I
define value-shift.
1 Takahiro Fujimoto (1999)
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Figure 1.6: Thesis Structure
In Chapter 3, I closely examine the recent technology transition from CRT to LCD and
describe how the value-shift took place in the TV set industry. I first describe why CRT TV
assemblers had to be vertically integrated, by illustrating the history of CRT TV industry. Then I
discuss the mechanism of value-shift with the emergence of the LCD technology in three stages.
First, the product architecture became more modularized and the industry came to be
horizontally divided as LCD became the dominant design in the flat panel TV industry. Second,
the LCD panel became the most important component in the TV set architecture because the
LCD panel has been the bottleneck; the development of only the LDC panel significantly
improved the overall performance. Lastly, Incumbent assemblers finally lost the design rule that
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controlled the overall architecture. Concluding the chapter, I suggest strategies for incumbent
assembly firms to defy the value-shift stage by stage.
In Chapter 4, I suggest a generalized mechanism of value-shift as an evolution in four
stages, using the modularity theory proposed by Baldwin and Clark' 7 . The first three stages are
drawn from the study of the TV set industry discussed in Chapter 3; the last one stage is
inferred from Intel's activities to take over the platform leadership 8 . I also show, by citing
industry examples, that the proposed mechanism is generally applicable to other assembly
industries. For each stage of value-shift, I suggest possible actions for both parties, i.e., for the
incumbent to defy the value-shift and for suppliers to strategically take over the value and
industry leadership.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by discussing the impact of the thesis and proposing
applying the theory to forecast on-going or future industry changes. I suggest using the theory
to forecast the current technology transition in three different industries where incumbent
firms need to take immediate strategic actions.
17 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
1 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002)
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Chapter 2: What is Value-Shift?
In this chapter, I first redefine value chain in a simplified and general way so that I can
generalize the concept of value-shift to many industries. Then I define value-added using
accounting terms so that I can quantify the value-shift from incumbent assemblers to suppliers
in the same value chain in real numbers. Quantifying this concept is important because
although many people have an intuitive understanding that a value shifts from incumbent
companies to other players in the same value chain as the industry matures; this phenomenon
has not been shown in numbers. By calculating the numerical impact of value-shift, I clearly
show that the problem of value-shift for incumbent assembly firms is that they lose the source
for maintaining their current high overhead cost structure.
2.1 Value Chain Redefinition
Value is the amount that buyers are willing to pay for products or services that a firm or
an industry provides to them. It is normally measured by total revenue, a reflection of the price
a firm's product command. A value chain is a chain of activities carried out by a firm or an
industry where those products or services gain value with each activity. Michael E. Porter
originally defined this term as meaning the set of activities in afirm and argued that the value
chains are different among competitors even in the same industry and that this difference is an
important source of a firm's competitive advantage' 9 . I completely agree with his viewpoint;
however, in this thesis I use the term to refer to a more generalized concept beyond an
individual firm.
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I define value chain as the set of activity steps done by all the firms involved in creating
the total value of the final products (or service), from upstream suppliers to downstream
distributors; each activity step is a set of activities done by one firm or sometimes by several
firms. In an industry that has complex firm networks, I extract only the major steps that
represent most of the values of the final product and include other miscellaneous activities in
the represented steps. Then I juxtapose the steps using the industry hierarchical orderfrom
incumbent assembler's perspective.
Here I show how this definition of value chain works in the automotive industry. The
automotive industry is one of the most complex assembly industries; as such, it includes many
different levels of value-adding activities. Generally, more than 1,000 firms are involved in
delivering one car to end customers 20. There are component suppliers, electric parts suppliers,
wire harness suppliers, tire suppliers, rubber suppliers that supply rubber to tire suppliers, steel
suppliers that supply steel products to both assemblers and components suppliers, and so on.
Although this scheme appears very complicated, the suppliers can be classified into several
buckets from the perspective of assemblers' (normally called OEMs). First, there are suppliers
that trade directly with OEMs and usually supply the set of component systems to OEMs. Those
suppliers are called tier 1 suppliers. Tier 1 suppliers purchase materials and parts from tier 2
suppliers, and tier 2 suppliers purchase from tier 3 suppliers, continuing in the same way. At the
most upstream, there are raw material suppliers, such as glass producers or steel
manufacturers that supply their products to all of the OEMs and suppliers.
For the purpose of calculating the effect of value-shift, I simply group these suppliers
into three categories: 1) component suppliers, 2) other parts suppliers, and 3) raw material
suppliers, as shown in Figure 2.1. 1) Components suppliers are mostly tier 1 suppliers to whom
20 The interactions within the value-network in the automobile industry is discussed precisely in Jianxi Luo, Daniel E.
Whitney, Carliss Y. Baldwin, and Christopher L. Magee (2009)
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OEMs delegate most of the core components. I classify tier 2 and upstream suppliers, except
material suppliers, as 2) other parts suppliers. I classify materials suppliers and most other
upstream players as 3) raw material suppliers, even though some of them trade directly to
OEMs (e.g., steel manufacturers). Many trading companies and logistics companies are
associated with the whole value chain, but I do not describe them explicitly in the value chain,
assuming their contributions to the total value are small and included in other players' value-
added. Also I eliminate industrial machines and robots suppliers from this value chain and add
their value in the OEMs' value-added as their operational cost because value-shift seldom
occurs between these types of suppliers and incumbent OEMs.
Tier 2 /upstream Tir14uple
Raw materials supplier Mnfcue
supplier s (Electric parts, (Component /iaca
other parts) supplier) (OEM) player A
Total
Value-
added
e Freescale -Delphi -Toyota
- Renesas -Denso -VW
-Bosch -Ford
Figure 2.1: Value Chain Example: Simplified Automotive Industry Value Chain
On the downstream of automotive OEMs, there are distributors such as car dealers and
car trading firms before getting to end customers. Financial players who provide loans also add
value to final products that consumers purchase. I place these players in the same bucket as car
dealer/financial player to simplify my scheme. I eliminate second-hand car dealers, insurance
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companies and aftermarket firms from the value chain, assuming these are not included in the
final product value. However, I note that these three categories enjoy the largest share of the
industry profit pool 21; therefore, going downstream is a lucrative strategy in the manufacturing
industry22.
With this simplified definition, we can categorize the whole value-adding activities into
five steps, as described in Figure 2.1. Generally, a detailed value chain differs according to
region and OEM firm; this difference is the source of the competitive advantage, as Michael
Porter has suggested23 ; however, the simplified automobile value chain is applicable to any
OEMs in any country.
In some industries with a complicated network of firms, it is hard to describe the whole
system as a single flow of a value chain. Some scholars have proposed that value-network is
suitable to describe a complicated industry where the network of complement suppliers is
more important than firms' internal activities, such as banking, insurance, advertising, and
mature mobile industry . However, as Christensen and Rosenbloom implied in their 1995
article, there is generally a hierarchical nested system in the value network 25 . Therefore, we
can project the two-dimensional value network onto one-dimensional value chain using this
hierarchy as we discussed in the automotive case in the previous section. As our definition of
value chain is a very simplified expression, we always have to extract only the categories that
play the most important roles in value-adding activities. The purpose of simplifying the value
chain is to show the value-shift in the industry; incumbent assemblyfirms are losing their value-
added, which is being taken over by suppliers in the industry; therefore, I select only
2 Profit pool is the accumulation of profit margins by all the players in the industry
2 Orit Gadiesh and James L. Gilbert (1998)
23 Michael E. Porter (1985)
24 Jeffrey L. Funk (2009)
2s Clayton M. Christensen, Richard S. Rosenbloom (1995)
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appropriate player that plays an important role in value-shift representing other players in the
value-chain.
2.2 Value-Added in Value Chain and Industry Cost Structure
Each step of the value chain adds value to a firm's products or services. The value-added
of one step is defined as the value of the products that one step is producing minus the
aggregated value-added in the previous steps. For example, the value-added of OEMs is the
value of the car they sell to distributors minus the total purchase cost of materials26.
Considering that by definition the value of a product is equal to the price of the product sold
downstream, we can define the value-added as price minus purchasing cost. Therefore, if we
depict the value-added by each step of a value chain as the water-fall graph shown in Figure 2.2,
this is equivalent to the industry cost structure.
Value-
added of
This Player
0
nal
Factors Included in
the Value-added
Revenue Purchasing
Cost
Figure 2.2: Definition of Value-Added Using Accounting Terms
26 The purchasing cost of industry machines or robots is not counted
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Here I emphasize that value-added is different from profit margin. Profit margin is
defined as price minus all of the operating costs, but value-added is price minus only the
purchasing costs of materials and components. Value-added, therefore, includes both the direct
labor and the indirect labor, such as R&D, sales and promotion, operational expenses17 and
other overhead costs. Value-added also includes profit margin. By using value-added instead of
profit pool, we can argue that a value-shift not only eats up all the profit margin but also
accounts for the huge decrease in incumbent firms' source of value-added, such as operating
and labor costs. I intend to offer a strong message to the management of incumbent firms
facing the threat of value-shift: they need to take immediate actions for either to defy value-
shift or to reduce their total cost structure.
With this definition of value-added using accounting terms, we can calculate the share
of value-added by each step of value chain using IR data of the firms or the cost structure data
given by industry research organizations. For example, we can estimate the share of value-
added in the automotive value chain around Toyota in the late 1990s, as shown in Figure 2.3.
The OEM's share of value-added differs slightly by region. For example, as Fujimoto has
shown28 , the suppliers' share of value-added out of the total production cost is roughly 70
percent (55% of the total car price) in Japan and United States and 60 percent (50% of the total
car price) in Europe. Also, within Japan, the share of value-added varies by OEMs; for example,
Toyota's share of value-added is lower than Nissan's29
Another method of calculating the share of value-added is to use the cost structure data
per unit. In the consumer electronics industry, such as TV sets, mobile handsets, and PCs, it is
very common for technology journalists to decompose devices when new products are released
27 If we see suppliers of the manufacturing equipment and plant developers as one of players in the value chain,
we should exclude depreciation from value-added and add those players into the value chain
28 Chapter 5 in Takahiro Fujimoto (1999)
29 Takahiro Fujimoto (1999)
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and to estimate their cost structure according to the parts used in the device. This data shows
how much an assembly firm spends for purchasing from outside, so a firm's value-added is
calculated as selling price minus purchasing cost. This ratio is equivalent to the definition using
accounting terms.
U35%
Total
Car
Price
Figure 2.3: Estimated Ratio of Value-Added in Toyota's Value Chain in Late 1990s 30
2.3 Value-Shift
When a new industry emerges, there is always a firm that creates the whole value chain
to provide final products or services to its end customers. Because a firm normally cannot itself
create everything from scratch, it has to find suppliers to provide components or raw materials.
Then the firm assembles components and materials into the final products. Sometimes
30 estimated dealer margin at roughly 10%. Within the wholesale price (90% of the total car price), the sum of
10% profit margin by Toyota (late 1990s) and 30% of the total production cost (81% of the total car price) is the
value-added by Toyota. Therefore the total value-added by Toyota is roughly 35% of the total car price. Of Toyota's
total procurement cost (55% of the total car price), I assume that 30% is from raw materials. According to Denso's
IR data, the profit margin is roughly 5% of total revenue (39% of total) and the procurement cost is 67% of its cost
(37% of total). By representing Denso as tier 1 suppliers, we estimate tier 1's value-added at roughly 15%.
Denso's data is 2000: http://www.denso.co.jp/ja/investors/financial/factbook/2000/files/non-con_2000_3.pdf
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assembly firms need complementers, who allow the firm's products and services to be more
useful for end customers. In addition, the firm needs distributors, who sell its products to
customers. The assembly firms that created the whole industry value chain generally become
the most powerful incumbent firms, controlling and orchestrating the value-chain. In assembly
product industries, those firms are generally vertically integrated. Incumbent assembly firms
can formulate the value chain so that they can add the biggest value to the industry and take
the most profitable part at the same time. (Note: the value chain creator is not always the
player who first invents a technology or first brings products to the market. The value chain
creator can purchase necessary technologies and thereby successfully create a value chain.)
I offer some examples of incumbent assembly firms that are vertically integrated and
control the value-chain. Motorola commercialized the first analog mobile handset and took the
biggest share of the value-added in the industry, delegating only a marginal portion to parts
suppliers31. IBM created and orchestrated the entire IBM-compatible PC value chain and took
the biggest share of value-added until those values were usurped by microprocessor and OS
suppliers. In a recent case, Apple re-created its own value chain for iPhone by finding non-
established suppliers for the microprocessors instead of existing mobile phone suppliers and
strengthened its power in the value chain.
Even if an industry started vertically and value chain creators took over the biggest
share in the value chain, value chains are generally divided more horizontally over time. Each
step in value chain is separated into several different steps and new players that specialized
only in one or two of the steps will emerge. Vertically integrated incumbent assembly firms
gradually lose their power over the value chain and lose their share of value-added. Instead,
horizontally specialized supplier firms take more share of value-added. This phenomenon is
31 Nabil Al-Najjar and David Besanko (2004)
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commonly observed in assembly industries as seen in Chapter 1, and I call this phenomenon
value-shift. I will discuss the mechanism of value-shift further in Chapter 3 and 4.
I discussed this phenomenon often with my colleagues at McKinsey and my clients in
the assembly industries. Most of them argued that horizontal division of labor or
modularization in the industry is the reason that incumbents are losing their power and value-
added. As discussed later in this thesis, I argue that horizontal division is just a trigger for value-
shift, but it is not the only reason. Modularization is inevitable to keep complex assembly
industries evolving at fast pace and to increase the total value of innovations in the industries32 .
However, value-shift is a phenomenon that firms can avoid strategically, even when the
industry has become modularized. In this thesis, I identify the mechanisms using four stages
that explain how value-shift occurs and intensifies. In each of the four stages, incumbent firms
can take strategic actions to defy the value-shift.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, I redefined the value chain to apply the concept of value-shift to even a
very complex industry. Then I defined value-added using accounting terms and cost structure.
This approach attempts to clarify how much incumbent assembly firms lose their value-added
needed to maintain their current organizational cost structure. On-going horizontal division of
labor is only the trigger for value-shift. Before moving on to explicate the mechanisms of value-
shift in detail, I will dive deeply into one consumer electronics industry to give a clearer picture
of the entire discussion.
3 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (1997); Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
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Chapter 3: Value-Shift in the TV Set
Industry
In this chapter, I look into recent TV set industry changes from Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT)
to flat panel displays and discuss how this technological change resulted in a large value-shift
from TV assemblers to panel suppliers. The CRT TV industry had been highly vertically
integrated since its inception and assemblers added most of the values to the final products. In
the early 2000s, CRT was replaced mostly by flat panel displays, and LCD (Liquid Crystal Display)
became the dominant design in the flat panel displays. Along with this technological change,
the industry dynamics also changed. The LCD TV industry is more modularized than the CRT
industry. Then incumbent assembly firms lost their source of value-added and component
suppliers instead added the largest value. I explain the mechanism behind the phenomenon
later in this chapter and generalize it to apply to other industries in next chapter.
Note that the change from CRT to LCD is not the architectural innovation that
Henderson and Clark have defined. Rather, this change is classified as a modular innovation
(Figure 3.1) because it changed only the core design concept and left the product architecture
unchanged 33. However, in this type of innovation, major assembly firms are also replaced and
values shift to new players.
33 Rebecca M. Henderson and Kim B. Clark (1990): Henderson and Clark picked the replacement of analog with
digital telephones as an example of modular innovation.
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The technological change from CRT to flat panel is best
described as a "modular innovation"
Core Concept
Reinforced Overturned
Incremental Mdular
0 Unchanged Innovation
C0.
o -W
.m C
c Changed Architectural Radical
0 Innovation Innovation
Figure 3.1: Henderson and Clark's framework
3.1 The CRT TV Industry Was Highly Vertically Integrated
Since the 1941, CRT had been the dominant technology in the TV set industry34 . First,
the black-and-white television was commercialized by RCA and it proliferated rapidly after
World War 1l. RCA utilized the technology developed for the war-time effort and accelerated
the proliferation by creating the industry standard with FCC authorization. RCA's standard was
soon followed by other suppliers such as Philco, Zenith, and Motorola and the product was
commoditized quickly. In the early 1950s, as the black-and-white television market settled into
maturity, the color television became the next focus of the industry. To make the transition
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from black-and-white to color smoothly, RCA sought to develop a color television set
compatible with the black-and-white technology, but this was a huge technological challenge.
To use the limited bandwidth effectively, it also had to broadcast more information than in
black-and-white in a narrower bandwidth, which was another major challenge. Those
challenges made RCA take a highly vertically integrated approach. It fully utilized the basic
scientific research in RCA Laboratories not only to solve such technological challenges35 but also
to improve performance and lower costs in the production of the cathode ray tubes for further
proliferation.
Figure 3.2: Basic Elements of CRT3
3s Wikipedia "Color Television": RCA introduced new encoding system that separate color information and
brightness information and reduce the resolution of color information to preserve bandwidth. Also it developed
new decoding system that combine high resolution brightness information from black-and-white and lower
resolution color image information.
The picture is from USITC (1995)
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Here I briefly explain the structure of the CRT TV set. An electromagnetic wave is
received by the tuner; then it is processed by the demodulator (or decoder), which recovers
information from electric signals and divide them into sound and picture information; the
picture information is further processed by demodulators and separators and then displayed in
the CRT. The CRT is the most valuable component in a TV set, consisting of about 50 % of the
total value in 1993 3 and 44% in 200838. As shown in Figure 3.2, the basic elements of a CRT are
a glass bulb (works as an envelope), an electric gun (produces and focuses an electric beam
onto screen) and a phosphor screen (also called an "aperture mask". It emits light when it
receives an electric beam).
RCA produced almost all of these components in-house. It had expertise in the tuner
technology that it developed at its radio receiver business and its war-time radar efforts;
therefore RCA produced the tuners in-house. In terms of the demodulators, encoding and
decoding of color images were the biggest obstacles to commercializing color televisions. RCA
resolved those problems with a vertically integrated approach, as discussed above; therefore,
RCA also kept this component in-house. The electric gun and the phosphorous-screen were the
major components needed for achieving better resolution, brightness and power consumption;
therefore, RCA also maintained the production of these components as a source of
competitiveness. Although other companies sourced glass bulbs from outside vendors, RCA
produced them in-house39 . Hypothetically there were two reasons that RCA do so: 1) RCA had
established high-level glass tube technologies in the vacuum tube business; 2) the glass bulb
was still an important source of cost reduction. Improving product performance and reducing
cost for all the CRT system therefore required a high level of integration of the basic research
done in RCA Labs and the consumer electronics division. As we have seen above, CRT TV set
3 USITC (1995)
3 Display Search (2008)
39 Inferred from the fact that Thomson still have glass production facility when it purchase RCA from GE
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production in the early days was highly vertically integrated by assemblers; RCA added the
biggest value in TV production.
The vertical integration of the TV set industry was a continuing trend for other players
after European and Japanese players took the market share from RCA in the world market.
Except the glass bulb, the major part of the value-added was added by assemblers. For example,
all seven television set manufacturers that operated in the U.S. in the 1990s40 developed their
CRT in-house. Demodulators and other devices for imaging were replaced by IC transistors, but
manufacturers kept the production of these ICs in-house as well. Especially the manufacturers
from Japan, which represented more than 60% of the world CRT production in 1990s,
continued the in-house development and production of ICs. This was not only because Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) politically urged them to maintain the
facilities for IC production in order to develop Japan's IC industry as a basis of the nation's
industrial development 4' but also because the integration of the IC and the CRT imaging was
necessary for manufacturers to maintain their cost competitiveness and increase their
worldwide market share. As Gene Gregory noted42 , this vertically integrated strategy was
important "to reduce the number of components used in the final product; design changes
which reduce the number and complexity of assembly operation; and extensive automation,
which reduces the number of workers required."
An estimated typical share of the value-added by CRT assemblers was 65-75% of the
total industry value-added; assemblers took the most value-added in the industry (Figure 3.3).
As we have seen, this level of vertical integration was important for TV set assemblers to
40 Hitachi, Matsushita, Sony, Toshiba, Philips, Thomson (acquired RCA in 1980s), and Zenith
41 The IC industry has been called "rice for industries." As rice is the staple food of Japanese people, so ICs are the
staple of Japanese industry. MITI negotiated with Texas Instruments (TI) in 1963-1968 for the use of TI's Kilby
patent and other IC technologies for all Japanese firms in return for letting TI enter the Japanese market. Mainichi
Newspaper Oct. 27, 1973
42 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (2001)
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maintain their competitiveness. As we discussed in chapter 2, value-added is equivalent to the
sum of labor cost, other overhead costs, operational expenses, and profit margin; therefore,
having the largest value-added means that assemblers have the largest labor resources, and
most of the time the largest investment in R&D. This enabled assemblers to be more
technologically advanced than the suppliers or complementers to and lead the technology
standard that components suppliers had to follow.
Share of total value-added by CRT assemblers was very high at
65-75% in 1990s
Vertically integrated65-75%TotalValue-
added
-Corning-Asahi 
-Hitachi 
-Thomson (RCA)
-Techneglas 
-Matsushita 
-Philips
-Thomson 
-Sony 'Zenith
-Toshiba
'Glass cost had increased due to increasing screen size and strong yen. Only Japanese glass producers could produce high
quality large glasses at that time
** Estimate
Source: USITC "Industry and Trade Summary - Television Picture Tubes and Other Cathode Ray Tubes" (1995)
Figure 3.3: Share of Value-Added in CRT TV Industry in 1993
Note that the modularization had already started in low-end small CRT TVs in the 1990s.
Given the tremendous capital investment in the production of picture tubes, it was not
economically feasible for all tube manufacturers to make every size of tube. For example, there
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were no CRTs smaller than 19 inches being produced in the United States in the 1990s. TV
manufacturers in the U.S. imported tubes from the affiliated plants abroad or bought tubes
from other U.S. tube builders43. In Japan, CRTs for low-end to mid-range products were
primarily acquired from Korea. Some of those suppliers, such as Samsung became major players
in the flat panel TV industry.
3.2 The Value Chain Divided in the Flat Panel TV Industry
In the late 1990s, several flat panel display standards were proposed by Japanese CRT
TV manufacturers; Plasma Display Panel (PDP) was developed by Panasonic (former
Matsushita), NEC and Hitachi; Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) by Sharp; Surface conduction
Electron-emitter Display (SED) by Canon and Toshiba; and Organic Light-Emitting Diode (OLED)
by Sony. Among those new standards, PDP and LCD were commercialized earlier than other
standards and replaced CRT within 10 years. In 2010, LCD is the practical dominant design in
the TV set industry with ten times more production of PDP; therefore, LCD industry practically
represents the TV industry. I will explain the industry dynamics of LCD in this section.
4 USITC (1995): Most of those tube builders provide mostly for non-TV uses; PC display, military and science
equipment.
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Figure 3.4: Sharp's Products with LCD (Calculator, Word Processor and Camcorder)4
RCA developed first LCD TV in 1964 in its laboratory, but it was Sharp that first
commercialized a 20-inch LCD flat panel TV that challenged the CRT TV market in 1999 with its
TFT (Thin Film Transistor) technology. Since Sharp commercialized LCDs for its pocket
calculators in 1973, this Japanese firm continued its effort to develop and commercialize larger
and brighter displays in many product fields, such as digital watches, word processors, portable
televisions, displays for camcorders and PDAs (Figure 3.4).
After the release of Sharp's 20-inch LCD TV, many other CRT TV manufacturers
accelerated their investments on the development of the LCD TVs and the competition
increased. The manufacturers that invested in other standards also started producing LCD TV
sets. The CRT market was replaced within only five years by the LCD technology (Figure 3.5).
Sharp's Corporate History: http://www.sharp.co.p/corporate/ifo/historv/h compan/index.html (in Japanese)
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of Total Market by displaying technology
To match the increasing demand of other manufacturers that entered the LCD TV
market, Sharp started providing LCD panel components in 2001. Sharp soon became the biggest
LCD panel supplier in the world. Then Samsung Electronics, a producer of LCDs for personal
computer displays, followed this move, and launched production of larger LCD panels in 2002.
Because the production of the TFT LCD technology is technically similar to that of
semiconductors, Samsung Electronics was able to use several identical technologies from its
semiconductor manufacturing, and rapidly achieved the industry's lowest production cost.
Several Taiwanese producers also started selling low-cost LCDs for incoming TV manufacturers.
In 2005, Sony, the largest CRT TV incumbent, delegated its LCD panel production to Samsung
Electronics in full scale via S-LCD, the joint venture between Sony and Samsung. After this event,
the separation of panel production, IC production, and TV assembly became typical in the
industry. The originally vertically integrated industry was now clearly divided into several
different layers (Figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.6: LCD TV Value Chain Is More Horizontally Divided
3.3 Value Shifted from Assemblers to Panel Suppliers
An estimated typical share of the value-added in the LCD TV industry is shown in Figure
3.7. The share of assemblers decreased significantly, from 65 to 75% in the CRT TV industry to
30% in the LCD TV industry. Obviously one of the reasons is that assemblers outsourced some
components (such as panels) to suppliers and lost the value-added of these components.
Another possible reason is that the value of assembly itself had decreased.
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Figure 3.7: Share of Value-Added in LCD Industry
Although historical comparison of the assembly value is difficult, we observe the
differences between the current CRT TV and the LCD TV (Figure 3.8). The value-added of the
video process and the circuit system that is normally done by assemblers is extremely squeezed
(34% -+ 8%) as well as the decrease in the assembly values (12% + 10%). Because the video
processes and circuit systems included a high-level of technological integration with the CRT,
we can say that the value of the assembly itself had decreased based on the data. For the above
two reasons, the value-added by assemblers greatly decreased in the LCD industry.
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Figure 3.8: FOB Cost Structure Comparison in 2008
The impact of the value-shift was huge for the incumbent assemblers such as Sony,
Philips, and Toshiba. As we have seen previously, the loss of value-added entailed the loss of
the financial resorces for the overhead costs and R&D. Therefore, those firms had to drastically
decrease the cost of assembly per unit and have a thinner operation compared to the CRT era.
This was the biggest consequence of the value-shift for incumbent firms: they could not
maintain ample resources when the value was shifted to the other part of the value chain.
Some firms quickly responded to the value-shift; among CRT incumbent firms that still remain
in Top 10 LCD brands, Philips started outsourcing its assembly of TV sets to low-cost OEM
makers in China and Taiwan and shut down its own facilities in Europe. Philips's outsourcing
ratio reached 62% in 2009. Also, Toshiba, the company first focused its R&D resources on SED
but later withdrew from this technology, has kept its outsourcing ratio very high.
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Along with losing the value-added in the industry, the incumbent assemblers also lost
technological leadership. It is now the panel suppliers that define the performance of the next
generation of TV sets and the timing of product releases. Especially for low-end LCD TVs, the
panel suppliers produce the "Industry Standard Panels" twice a year and the TV assemblers
adjust their facilities to those standards. The power to control the whole industry now resides
within the panel suppliers.
3.4 Mechanism of the Value-Shift in the LCD TV Industry
Can CRT incumbent firms defy value-shift? To answer this question, I will explain the
mechanism behind value-shift in this industry. Three major stages were observed.
1. Further splitting of the product architecture and the division of the value chain.
The architecture of the LCD TV has been split into smaller subsystems and the
4s DisplaySearch News; DisplaySearch Quarterly LCD Value Q3'08 - Q1"09
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industry value chain has been divided. The interfaces between the subsystems are
defined clearly and the interrelations between them have disappeared.
2. Centralization of the product values in single subsystem. The value of the product
has been centralized only in the LCD panel because product performances highly
depended on the quality of the panel. In comparison, the other components have
lost the value.
3. Losing the "Design rule" or failing to build it: The assemblers have lost control over
the whole architecture, especially over the LCD panel, now that makes the biggest
contribution to the final product. Using Baldwin and Clark's term46 , the assemblers
have lost the design rule of the architecture or failed to build it.
3.4.1 Further split of the product architecture and the division of the value
chain
As discussed earlier, the development and production of the CRT TV was vertically
integrated. Within the whole product architecture, the CRT display required many
interrelations with the other major subsystems, such as demodulators and imaging processors,
because the picture quality depended on all of these components and the interconnections
between them. However, the LCD panel was independent in the product architecture in 2004,
when many panel supplier firms started to provide LCD panels independently from assembly of
TV sets. The product architecture was more divided; and the split product architecture enabled
the further division of the value chain in this industry. Here I propose two hypotheses to explain
why the architecture had to be split.
4 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
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Hypothesis: The display technology had to be separated from other components to accelerate
the evolution of the LCD panel technologies while utilizing other component technologies that
were already well developed.
When the industry shifted from the CRT to the LCD, component technologies such as
electromagnetic receivers or imaging processors were already highly advanced in the CRT TV
industry. Therefore, it was natural for the firms to utilize those technologies for LCD TVs. To
replace only one component in the system, two goals had to be achieved: 1) the interfaces
between the subsystems had to be defined more clearly and 2) the interrelations between
subsystems had to be reduced. This transformation is conceptually drawn in a task structure
matrix47 as shown in Figure 3.10. The gray cells represent interrelations between the two tasks.
When the CRT was replaced by the LCD, interrelations between the tasks in the display unit and
those in the imaging units were significantly reduced and the information of each component
became hidden within each subsystem. Baldwin and Clark argued that if a component is
independent and hidden from other components, changes to the components can be made
without changing rest of the system.
is lal
maging maging
Figure 3.10: TV Set Components Modularization to Allow Component Replacement
4 A task structure matrix is topologically identical to a design structure matrix most of the time. The definition of
the matrix is explained in Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
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There was another major motivation for LCD TV firms to separate the LCD panel from
other components and accelerate its development at a faster pace. In the early 2000s, the
market evaluation of LCD TVs was much lower than that of PDP (Plasma Display Panel) TVs.
Many industry experts at that time believed that the performance of LCDs could hardly surpass
that of well-developed CRT technologies. They believed it was more feasible for the PDP
technology to replace the CRT technology. If the LCD technology had allowed the PDP
technology to take over the rapidly growing flat panel market, the LCD technology could have
not become the dominant design in this industry. Therefore, it was the number one priority for
LCD manufacturers to separate the LCD panel from other components to achieve its evolution
at a faster pace.
It is common for a system architect to separate bottleneck subsystems from other
components to allow changes within the component. For example, as Gawer and Cusumano
described 48, Intel aggressively separated its processor from other PC components and
developed an interface to hide core processor functions in order to accelerate the evolution of
processors faster than other slowly developing modules.
Hypothesis 2: The production of the LCD is more capital intensive and has a huge economy of
scale; centralizing its production to the limited number of manufacturers could significantly
reduce capital investment per unit industry-wide.
The production of TFT-LCD panels became capital intensive because it required
technology-intensive expensive fabrication equipments as in the semiconductor industry.
Therefore, shortening the processing time per unit and producing at a larger scale are the key
sources of cost reduction. As shown graphically in Figure 3.11, the TFT-LCD therefore has a
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larger economy of scale than the CRT. Assemblers need various sizes of LCD panels, producing
of each size at a small scale for their own-use becomes economically unfeasible. This trend led
further division of the entire value chain. The separation of capital intensive subsystems within
an industry is very common in other industries, such as semiconductor production in the
computer industry.
COsW LCD
unit 1\
CRT
Number of units
Figure 3.11: Cost of Production per Unit in CRT and LCD
In summary, two hypotheses may explain why the division of the value chain had been
accelerated in the LCD TV set industry: 1) to replace only CRT displays with LCD panels in the TV
set architecture and accelerate the development of only the LCD component; 2) the industry
level economy of scale. As we have seen, these hypotheses are supported by some evidence,
but will need stronger evidence based on interviews and other sources in future research.
3.4.2 Centralization of the values to one module
The split of the architecture and the division of labor is not the only reason why
incumbent assembly firms lost their values. In addition, LCD panels became the most valuable
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component in the architecture but the incumbent assembly firms lost access to them. Below is
my hypothesis to account for this phenomenon.
Hypothesis: The bottleneck49 of the system is more valuable than other subsystems because
the firm can increase the value of the entire system by improving only the bottleneck. The LCD
was the bottleneck of the TV set; therefore the value has shifted to the LCD panel.
Generally a bottleneck in a system means the location or component that constrains the
performance of entire complex system5o. I use this term in the thesis specifically meaning a
subsystem that determines the performance of the entire system and has a large improvement
potential. As Carliss Baldwin discussed in her recent paper5 1, historically there were successful
companies that separated bottlenecks from the whole system and achieved improvement of
the whole system by focusing their resources only on the development of the bottleneck
components. Having a bottleneck component in-house is the biggest source of the value for
firms because a firm can improve the performance of the entire system if it succeeds in
improving only the bottleneck component.
Below I present evidence that the LCD panel in the early period was clearly the
bottleneck in the TV set. As shown in Figure 3.12, all the important performance measures
were lower than in other competing standards, and all of them resided in the LCD panels. The
critical issues for LCD were the screen size and the response ratio. As shown in Figure 3.12, the
biggest LCD screen size available in 2001 was only 20 inches; therefore, the LCD TV was
believed to serve only personal uses rather than the living room use served by the CRT TV.
Another critical issue was response time, which is the amount of time it takes for one pixel to
49 Carliss Baldwin redefines "bottleneck" in her recent working paper: Carliss Y. Baldwin (2010)
so Sendil K. Ethiraj (2007)
si Carliss Y. Baldwin (2010)
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go from active to inactive. Until 2001, the response time was more than 20 milliseconds and it
caused motion lag, trailer effect, fast motion blur, and smearing, especially for action scenes,
sports, and video games. Lower contrast ratio and smaller color spectrum coverage led to the
bad reputation of LCD technology compared to PDP: "LCDs was dim and dark"s2
Most LCD performance measures were lower than CRT but
grow rapidly and finally surpassed CRT in 2002-2006.
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Figure 3.12: Improvement in Performance Measures in LCD and PDP technologies
Despite all these concerns in the early 2000s, LCD achieved better performance in those
four critical measures than CRT and some even surpassed the level that human beings can
52 From the web-news in 2001
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recognize53 from 2002 to 2006. Consequently, as we have seen in Figure 3.5, the share of LCDs
in the total TV market exceeded that of PDPs in 2004 and ensured LCDs' success as the
dominant design in flat panel TVs.
Therefore, not only did the LCD panel have to be separated from other components, but
owning this bottleneck component and continuously developing the performance of the
component were sources of the competitiveness. In other words, other components were
commoditized and the value of the product was centralized in this independent module (Figure
3.13).
Figure 3.13: The Source of the Value Was Centralized in the LCD Panel
At present, major competitiveness shifted to other measurements, such as thinness of
the display and lower power consumption, after LCD reached the CRT-level performance.
However all of the important performance measures still reside in the LCD panel. More
specifically, the source of value is even more centralized only in the backlight component of the
Sa Response time was improved to 4ms in 2005, but the difference between 4ms and 8ms is hardly recognized by
humans; therefore, the response time of major models scaled back to 8ms.
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LCD panel (accounting for 20-30% of the total cost of the LCD panel.)54 In other words, the
backlight is becoming the bottleneck of the entire system and maintaining the development and
production of backlight components in-house has become the source of competitiveness.
3.4.3 Losing the "Design Rule" or Failing to Build It
Baldwin and Clark defined design rule of a system as "the privileged parameters" that
"affect other parameter choices (in the system) but they themselves cannot be changed"55 . In
other words, a design rule is a set of parameters that controls the role and the behaviors of all
the modules in the system. In the ideal modularized industry, there is always a design rule that
defines and addresses the following categories of the design information:
* Architecture: what modules will be part of the system, and what their roles will be;
* Interfaces: detailed descriptions of how the different modules will interact, including
how they will fit together, connect, communicate, and so forth;
e integration protocols and testing standards: procedures that will allow designers to
assemble the system and determine how well it works, whether a particular module
conforms to the design rules, and how one version of a module performs relative to
another.
If an assembly firms possesses this type of design rule, the firm is able to control the
amount of the value that each component supplier adds, even when the firm does not own the
bottleneck component (such as an LCD panel). This is because the design rule by definition can
define the role of each component supplier and the relations between them. Owning a design
rule is the source of the value of the assembly. Therefore, if an assembler firm could
successfully build the design rule of the entire LCD TV architecture through defining the role of
s4 DisplaySearch (2005)
ss Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
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all component suppliers and controlling the interfaces and interactions between components,
the firm would be able to maintain higher value of the assembly.
However, technically there were no incumbent assemblers that possess the design rule
over the entire LCD TV architecture. At present, most of the interfaces between components
are determined by different players in the value chain. For example, industry standards in
encoding and decoding such as MPEG-2 or MPEG-4 are proposed mostly by media content
providers. Digital signal receiver protocols are called HDMI and are normally determined by
assemblers, with each assembler having a different standard; Panasonic uses EZ-Sync, Samsung
uses Anynet+, Sony uses Theatre Sync, Toshiba uses CE-LINK, LG uses SimpLink, etc56 .The
interfaces between imaging processors and LCD panels are often proposed by semiconductor
suppliers. Therefore, there is no ideal design rule owner in the LCD TV industry and the
assemblers are failing to control the whole value chain; in consequence, they are losing
assembly's value itself. This contrasts to the fact that IBM and Compaq could at least maintain
assemblers' values in the PC industry by controlling the design rule such as PC-AT bus systems,
as discussed in Chapter 4.
In this section, we have seen that there are three steps in the mechanism explaining
why the value of the assembly was squeezed and shifted and centralized only to the LCD panel
component. An important message of this section is that value-shift is driven not only with the
division of the value chain; the further splitting of the product architecture and resultant
division of the value chain is the trigger for the value-shift, but there are other important stages
that cause value-shift. Two main reasons that the incumbent assembly firms lost their values
are: 1) the LCD component was the bottleneck for the total value of the product and; 2)
assemblers failed to possess the design rule of the entire LCD TV architecture.
56 http://www.crutchfield.com/S-SXOv2DDxfZy/learn/learningcenter/home/tv glossary.html
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3.5 Conclusion - What Can Incumbent Companies Do to Defy
Value-Shift?
The TV industry was originally vertically integrated when the CRT technology was the
dominant design; therefore, the incumbent firms of the CRT era had all the resources from the
production of components to the assembly of the final product. However, since the industry
shifted to the LCD technology, the value chain has been divided and the value has shifted to
only one of the component suppliers - the LCD panel suppliers. The panel suppliers now add
more value to the final product and began to control the industry trend. On the other hand, the
value-added provided by the assemblers has been squeezed and the CRT incumbent firms have
had to change their operation to reduce the production cost per unit significantly.
What can those CRT incumbent firms do to defy value-shift? To answer this question, I
argue that there are three stages in the mechanism of value-shift: 1) the LCD TV product
architecture was split into several independent components and the entire value chain was
divided further; 2) the source of the value was shifted only to the LCD panel because it was the
bottleneck in the entire architecture and the incumbent assembly firms lost access to the
component; 3) the assemblers failed to own the design rule to define roles of the components
suppliers and control their value-added. Considering these three steps, there are logically four
potential solutions for the incumbent firms to defy value-shift.
3.5.1 Strategy 1: Stop the splitting of the value chain
The first possibility for the incumbent firms to defy the value-shift is to stop the industry
trend of splitting the product architecture and to keep the value of the assembler. Because
normally a vertically integrated assembler has a control over the whole architecture, it can
control the level of the clarity of the interfaces and the level of interrelations between
components. One example of an incumbent assembler maintaining its power over the value
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chain by deterring modularization is Toyota's supplier management. In Toyota's case, it defines
the interfaces between components clearly and delegates each module to the supplier firms
completely; however, it maintains a high level of interrelations between components provided
by different supplier firms57. Supplier firms should relate to each other under Toyota's control
and modify their products to fit with other components. Other Japanese car assemblers, such
as Nissan, take a similar supplier management strategy. Consequently, the level of the
interrelations between the supplier companies in Japanese car industry is very high compared
to the other industries such as the electronics industry58.
However, in this TV industry example, the further split of the product architecture
seems inevitable. The option value gained by the entire industry through modularity was bigger
than the other costs associated with modularization. As discussed above, other components in
the TV sets, such as processors, were highly developed and it is more economically feasible to
use existing processor technologies. Also, to lower the capital investment per unit, centralizing
the production of panels to only some of the panel suppliers make sense for the entire industry.
Therefore, avoiding the further splitting of the architecture is not a feasible strategy for an
incumbent to take.
3.5.2 Strategy 2: Disperse the value of the product to several components
The second possible solution that incumbent firms can employ is to let other
components take on a major functionality and lower the relative value of the LCD panel in the
entire TV set system; in other words, to make other components the "bottleneck" of the system
by achieving significant improvement. It is especially important to shift the values from LCD to
the components that the incumbents still owns.
57 Takahiro Fujimoto (1999)
s8 Jianxi Luo, Daniel E. Whitney, Carliss Y. Baldwin, and Christopher L. Magee (2009)
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This strategy has already been adopted by some incumbent assembly firms. For example,
since 2005, Sony has tried to achieve some of the important performance measures, such as
colorfulness and power consumption, in the components that it develops and produces in-
house, such as imaging processors or its advanced film technologies59. It tried to shift the
source of the value from the LCD panel suppliers to itself by making processors and thin films
more valuable than the panel. However, as we have seen in Figure 3.12, colorfulness (color
spectrum coverage) or brightness (contrast ratio) of LCD TVs has already surpassed the levels of
CRT TVs and what the imaging processors and thin films can achieve was marginal. Also, Sony
tried to lower power consumption by changing the image processing mechanism in the
processors and using better quality thin films. However, before achieving significant improve
through such attempts, Sony decided to source its core processors from Intel in 2010". Toshiba
also employed a similar strategy and in 2009 introduced an LCD TV set using its low power
consuming processor "CELL" that this company developed together with Sony and IBM6 . The
consequences of this strategy are not clear yet.
3.5.3 Strategy 3: Build the Design Rule in the whole TV set architecture
The third strategy that TV set assemblers can employ is to set the design rule in the
industry by defining the standard interfaces between the major components across the entire
architecture and controlling the power of all the suppliers. One of the firms that successfully
owned the design rule of the product system and took over the value from the industry was
Intel in the PC industry. Intel successfully took over the design rule from assembly firms by
determining the industry standard interfaces called the PCI bus and the USB, which realized
faster information transfer between components than the interfaces formerly provided by
59 Company news release
60 Company news release; March 2010
61 Company news release; October 2009
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assemblers, such as IBM62 . Building an end-customer's pull with marketing campaigns such as
"Intel Inside" and establishing a strong bargaining power were also keys in maintaining the
power of the design rule and taking control across the industry. I will discuss this case in more
detail in Chapter 4.
In the LCD TV set industry, however, there is no single player that builds the design rule
for the entire system and successfully controls the power of suppliers. Incumbent assembly
firms can take further actions to take over the role of determining design rules of the whole
system.
Note that interlinks between components in a TV set is no longer a major source of
competitiveness as in the PC industry in the 1990s when Intel developed the PCI bus. Therefore,
adopting this strategy solely is not an effective option; this strategy must be employed along
with other strategies.
3.5.4 Strategy 4: Maintain or re-enter the components with the biggest
value
Even after the value chain is divided and the value-added is completely taken over by
one of the components, there is one more strategy that incumbent assemblers can take. By
possessing the development and the production of the LCD panel through a merger and
acquisition, assemblers can add the biggest value in the value chain and it will be easier for
them to take over technology leadership and control the other players.
This is actually the strategy that panel suppliers are now taking to preserve the value of
their LCD panels. The source of the performance measures is now shifting to the backlight
component of the LCD panel, and the backlight panel is taking the biggest share of the value-
added in the LCD panel (20-30% o total LCD panel value). Therefore, LCD panel suppliers such as
62 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002)
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Samsung and Sharp are aggressively acquiring the backlight companies and develop and
produce most of the backlight in-house. By doing this, Samsung and Sharp can maintain their
technology leadership in the panel industry and control the design rule in the panel
components.
Another example of an assembler engaging this strategy and successfully possessing the
value-added is Toyota in the hybrid car industry. The source of value in the hybrid car industry
is shifting to the battery technology because the battery is the bottleneck of the system to
improve the value of the hybrid car. Toyota first created a fifty-fifty joint venture with
Panasonic, a Japanese electronics manufacturer with significant expertise in lithium battery
technologies, and developed the battery technologies for the hybrid car. However, now Toyota
is increasing its share of this joint venture to 60% and integrating the core technologies from
this company into Toyota.
A possible action that TV assemblers could take is to acquire smaller panel suppliers in
Taiwan or in China; however, it might be difficult for the assemblers to take such a bold move
because most of them are suffering from the loss of cash flows.
Among these four possible strategies that assembler firms can take to maintain their
high share of the value-added, strategy 2 through strategy 4 are meaningful actions. In the next
chapter, I will generalize the mechanism of value-shift and examine the strategies using other
industry example.
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Chapter 4: Value-Shift Mechanism
As seen in the TV set industry, incumbent firms can lose their value in the industry by
losing access to the bottleneck components that are the keys to improve the total performance
of the product and also by losing control over the design rule that determines the role of the
players in the value chain. This phenomenon is also common in other assembly industries, such
as the personal computer, the mobile handset, and the automotive industries. In this chapter, I
describe the general mechanism and the evolution of the value-shift in four stages, suggested
by the analysis of the TV industry in the previous chapter. I also describe each stage of the
value-shift with examples from other industries. Then I propose the alternative strategies the
incumbent firms could take to resist value-shift trends.
Incumbent firms did not lose its value-added only at one time. They lose most of the
value-added through several wrong strategy decision-makings, not only once. Therefore,
clarifying the mechanism of each stage of the value-shift is valuable to find the set of strategies
that incumbent firms should take to defy value-shift.
4.1 Stage 1: Product Architecture Modularization and the
Division of the Value Chain.
The first stage of the value-shift is further division of the labor in the industry. This
industry dynamics occurs along with modularization of the product architecture. In the previous
chapter I described further splitting of the TV sets architecture is the first stage; here I use the
word modularization instead of splitting. Modularity includes the concept of splitting the
architecture into subsystems but is defined in the more generalized way. Baldwin and Clark
argued that the modularity is captured by the idea of interdependence within and independence
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across modules and the tree terms: abstraction, information hiding and interface". Moreover,
they describe modularity as following; if the structure has the form of a nested hierarchy, is built
on units that are highly interconnected in themselves, but largely independent of other units; if
the whole system, then, by our definition, the thing is module64 .The essence of modularity is
defined by following three characteristics:
1. Nested subsystems : subsystems exist in the system in a clear hierarchy;
2. Reduced interdependence and the design rule: the interrelations between
subsystems are reduced so that the subsystems' information is "hided" from the
whole complex system; as a consequence, some requirements are extracted from
subsystems and generalized as a "design rule"
3. Clearly defined interfaces: the interfaces between subsystems are clearly defined.
For example, in the LCD TV set case, these characteristics were met when CRT displays
were replaced by LCDs. The interrelations among a display and other subsystems were defined
and eliminated and the interfaces between them were clearly determined. This modularity
allowed the CRT displays to be replaced by the LCD panels without affecting other components
such as demodulators, imaging processors or tuners. The interrelations between components
are represented by the off-diagonal color cells in Figure 4.1. At least one conference between
the people in charge of each component is required in order to determine the priorities and
clarify the requirements of the subsystems. All the priorities and requirements are extracted as
the design rule of the system. Then the product architecture is modularized.
This modularity of the architecture led to the division of the value chain. Because the
interrelations between each component are reduced and the interfaces are clarified, different
6 P63 (Chapter 3) of Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
* P123 (Chapter 5)of Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
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firms can develop and produce each component. In the LCD TV industry, for instance,
production of the LCD panel and assembly of TV sets are often done by different players.
Figure 4.1: Modularization of the LCD TV set architecture
Modularization of product architecture and the accompanying value chain division are
often seen in other industries. In the mobile handset industry, for instance, the IG analog
handset industry was highly integrated and mostly owned by Motorola. However the value
chain was completely divided in the 2G and 3G technologies, and those subsystems were
developed and produced by different players; baseband semiconductor by Qualcomm, Infineon,
etc.; multimedia processors by Samsung, etc.; OSs by Nokia-Sony Ericsson (Symbian), Microsoft,
and Google etc.; handset assembly by Nokia, Sony Ericsson, Samsung, Apple, and etc.; and the
mobile applications by various producers65. Modularization of the computer systems is also a
famous story. IBM developed the first modular family of computer systems, the System/360 to
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achieve a compatible product line66. The modularization of the tasks in the System/360 was not
followed by the division of the industry, but it led a division of labor within IBM. IBM also led
the modularization of the personal computers in order to outsource the development of some
components such as OS and micro processors for the faster launch. This event later triggered
further division of labor in the industry.
Often times, firms should drive modularization for several reasons. One of the biggest
reasons is to evolve the complex system without "writing off "the investment made in old
technologies and to utilize the existing assets as much as possible. Modularity enables the
firm to evolve the whole system by replacing only one or two obsolete subsystems and utilizing
other subsystems. This is what occurred in the LCD TV industry. Also, modularity enables each
subsystem to evolve at a different pace because each subsystem does not affect the others. For
example, to increase the performance of its processor in personal computers, Intel modularized
the PCs architecture through defining interfaces between its processor and other components
and hiding its processor from other components68 .
Another major motivation for the incumbent firms to drive modularization is to increase
the value of the total system with the same level of investment. Using the option value theory,
Baldwin and Clark have shown that a certain modularization will bring a bigger pay-off by
enabling the industry to select better combination of subsystems69 . Like a stock portfolio,
holding options on a number of different subsystems permits the system to have less risk and
higher expected value. With modularization, firms can maximize the system's value by selecting
the best option in each component, deleting the components that are no longer valuable, or
adding the components which become valuable. There is always an additional associated cost,
such as the cost of achieving modularity, experimentation and integration; however, a new
66 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
6 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
68 Gawer and Cusumano (2002)
69 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
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combination of components generally gives higher value than the additional cost. Historically,
many firms have benefited from modularity. Therefore, further modularization of the product
architecture is often inevitable for firms.
Modularization of the architecture and the resulting division of the value chain is the
trigger for value-shift; however, it does not solely entail value-shift. As long as the incumbent
assembler firm owns the design rule to control the whole value chain and the development and
the production of the strategic (or bottleneck) components, the firm can maintain a certain
level of power over the industry and the value-added even when the firm outsources some of
the non-strategic components. Apple's iPhone is a good example: the iPhone's product
architecture is highly modularized and most of its components are outsourced to outside
vendors. The outsourced components include not only commodities such as the display module,
cameras and a flash memories, but also components with a smaller number of suppliers, such
as an RF transistor and a baseband processor (Figure 4.2). However, the customers' key buying
factors depend almost entirely on the OS and applications, so the quality of the software
development and the management of the third-party application vendors is the bottleneck of
the total system. Therefore, while controlling the suppliers' power through a strong design rule
applied to the product, Apple focuses only on those two factors. As a consequence, Apple has a
higher value-added (estimated 40% of the total value-added) than any other components
supplier firm in the industry (Figure 4.3). Outsourcing is possible because the product
architecture is highly modularized. However, Apple can take the biggest value-added in the
industry, being the design rule owner. Modularization itself is not the sole mechanism by which
incumbent firms lose the power and the value-added. It is simply a trigger for them to lose the
strategic bottleneck components or lose the design rule.
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Figure 4.3: Apple's Estimated Value-Added in the Industry
Considering that a high level of modularization can trigger the value-shift, avoiding the
modularization is one of the strategies that an incumbent can take. As discussed briefly in the
70 Source: iSuppli; C-net news (2009/06/24): http://news.cnet.com/8301-13924_3-10272240-64.html
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section 3.5.1, Toyota intentionally leaves the interfaces between Toyota and its suppliers
unclear even in supplier proprietary parts or black-box parts to strengthen the control over the
suppliers71.Toyota then owns and maintains the design rule of the total architecture and
defines the role of suppliers. Leaving a certain amount of interrelations unclear will help the
firm to maintain its power over the industry and therefore the value-added in the whole system.
Avoiding modularization is important not only for owning control over the industry but
also for crisis management. Too much modularization makes it difficult for assemblers to find
problems because a problem can be hidden in one of the many subsystems. For example,
Boeing delayed the completion of its Dream Liner because it modularized the product
architecture into too many modules with too many suppliers; therefore, it took a long time to
find the problem when integrating the total system7.
4.2 Stage 2: Values Centralized in a Single Module and
Incumbents Lost the Access
The second stage of the value-shift is that only a few subsystems of the entire system
become more important than other subsystems. In addition, the incumbent firms that were
originally vertically integrated assemblers delegate the development and production of those
valuable components, intentionally or unintentionally, to suppliers and lose access to those
components. An unintentional example is the CRT- to - LCD technology transition. Most of the
CRT TV incumbent assembly firms lost access to LCD because they had bet other technologies
such as PDP, SED and OLED, which finally did not come out as the dominant design. An
intentional example was IBM's PC case. To launch the product within 15 months, in order to
catch up with the rapidly growing Apple 11 computers, IBM outsourced the design of most of its
7 Kim B. Clark and Takahiro Fujimoto (1991)
7 James McNerney lecture in MIT Sloan (April 2010)
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major components to non-IBM manufacturers73 and did not need to wait long to gain
expertise74 .This strategy enabled IBM to be in an industry leadership position (its market share
was 50% in 1985) and to control the role of suppliers and maintain strong bargaining power
until the late 1980s. Either intentionally or unintentionally, losing access to the source of value
weaken incumbent firms' power over the value chain can leads to stage 3 of the value-shift
described below.
As illustrated by in the TV industry case, the main reason that only one of components
becomes valuable is that the component is the bottleneck of the entire system; a firm can
improve the value of the whole system by improving the performance of the bottleneck
component. Possessing a bottleneck component in-house is the biggest source of the value for
a firm. There are other industry examples: in the automobile industry, software and electronic
parts become the most valuable components because most of quality problems are now arise
from the unreliability of electronic components; according to McKinsey & Company's research,
electronic failures are responsible for approximately half of all vehicle breakdowns 75.
Furthermore, it takes a long time to integrate and test the software, delaying the time to
market and becoming the critical issues for assemblers. Therefore, the improvements in
electronics and software will increase the total performance of the car significantly; they are
clearly the bottleneck. However, those bottlenecks are now mostly owned by electronics
suppliers (such as Bosch and Denso) and the incumbent OEMs are losing value in the industry.
Here I describe the mechanisms of how only one or two components become
bottlenecks using the "modular operators" proposed by Baldwin and Clark. Of six modular
operators, splitting and excluding are not related to the creation of a bottleneck; the other four
7 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. (2001)
7 Peter L. Grant (2000)
7s P87, McKinsey & Company (2005): McKinsey forecasts the value of the electronic components will increase to
40% of the total vehicle value in 2015 from 19% in 2004
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operators substituting, augmenting, inverting and porting can be operators to create
bottleneck module. (Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5)
1) Substituting:the normal module 2)_Augmenting:new bottleneck
was substituted by the bottleneck module wasradded to the syte m
Figure 4.4: Four Modular Operators to Create Bottleneck Module (1 of 2)
1) Substituting one module with a new bottleneck module: The LCD TV case
illustrates this mechanism. A subsystem (a display) becomes the bottleneck because the old
and saturated technology (CRT) was substituted to the emerging new technology (LCD). Now
the performance of the substituted module is very low and the improvement of the module is
the key to improving the overall performance of the system. Other modules lose value-added
relative to the new bottleneck module. In this mechanism, the incumbent firms easily lose their
access to the bottleneck module because supplier firms (Sharp and Samsung) that already have
the expertise in the technology (LCD) use their expertise to replace the old components (CRT)
with the new bottleneck component (LCD). Therefore, the incumbent firms can lose values.
2) Augmenting - adding a new bottleneck module to the system: The car
electronics and software case I described earlier illustrates this mechanism. Mechanical parts
and assembly were originally the largest source of value-added and mostly owned by
incumbent assemblers (OEMs). However, electronic parts and software, the bottleneck
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modules, were added to the system and mechanical parts and assembly have lost their value
relative to the new modules. OEMs do not have the expertise in those new modules; instead 1st
tier electronic components suppliers such as Bosch and Denso have the expertise. Supplier
firms now have more value-added as well as more power to control the performance of the
entire system. Consequently, the incumbent firms' value-added is squeezed.
Figure 4.5: Four Modular Operators to Create Bottleneck Module (2 of 2)
3) Inverting new bottleneck module: Inverting means extracting core functions
from the system and creating a design rule. A design rule is the set of tasks or modules that are
at the top of the hierarchical orders of the system, visible to the entire system and interrelated
to other hidden modules. A change in the design rule will affect all the modules in the system.
The modules that function as design rules are called architectural modules by Baldwin and
Clark76. (Figure 4.6)
Creation of operating systems is one example of an inverting new bottleneck module.
Once the operating system is extracted as the set of functions that rule the functions of other
components, it becomes the bottleneck component of the system and its focused development
P333 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
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becomes the competitive advantage. By inverting a set of bottleneck functions into a
bottleneck module and focusing investments on its development, a firm can make investments
more efficient. When this module is separated from the entire development process and is
acquired by supplier firms, those firms have more value-added in the industry. This took place
when IBM inverted operating systems and microprocessors of personal computers and
outsourced them to Microsoft and Intel.
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Figure 4.6: Design rule knows and interact with other modules
Note that inverting is an important module operator for suppliers wanting to take over
the design rule from the incumbent assemblers and assume industry leadership, as I will discuss
in section 4.4, the fourth stage of the value-shift mechanism.
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4) Porting a module into a new bottleneck module in other system: Porting means
taking out a module developed for one system and making it work in another system. This
operator is a combination of splitting and creating an interface (called a translator module)
between the ported module and the new system. Porting often works to create a new
bottleneck module in other systems.
In the mobile handset industry, for instance, porting operating systems from PC
architecture to mobile handset architecture created a new bottleneck in this industry. The
mobile handset was originally vertically integrated and the bottlenecks were spread out over
the architecture. However, the OS became the competitive advantage after it was ported. Firms
that had expertise in OS development became the key players in this industry, such as
Microsoft and Apple. Porting an idea of an independent microprocessor into the mobile
handset created a bottleneck as well. When handset assembler firms outsourced those ported
bottlenecks to supplier firms, supplier firms gained larger value-added in the industry.
Qualcomm in 3G baseband processor and Samsung and Intel in multimedia processors came to
take a large portion of value-added in the handset industry.
These four modular operators work to create a bottleneck and shift it from incumbent
assemblers to suppliers. By losing the control of the bottleneck module that determines the
overall performance of the system, an incumbent firm also loses the biggest portion of its
value-added. This process is one of the mechanisms by which value shifts from incumbent
assemblers to suppliers.
4.3 Stage 3: Incumbent firms "Lost" the Design Rule
After the incumbent firms lose the most valuable bottleneck component, they also tend
to lose the overarching rule that control the entire architecture: the design rule.
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Losing the bottleneck module (stage 2) and losing the design rule (stage 3) is different.
Losing a bottleneck module solely drives the value-shift, as discussed in section 4.2, but losing
the design rule entails a further value-shift. For example, in the PC industry, when IBM lost
bottleneck components by outsourcing the development of OS and microprocessors when it
launched the PC business in 1981, it lost more of its value-added (stage 2) than when it did not
outsource at all. Although there are many IBM PC-compatible businesses and the PC market
was very competitive, IBM remained the most powerful player and set the directions that others
followed77 by maintaining and updating the design rule that determined the entire PC
architecture. For instance, in 1984, it was IBM who introduced the more advanced PC-AT
architecture and the rest of the industry. Not only the suppliers and complementary goods
suppliers but also PC clone makers followed IBM's movement. In this architecture, the ISA
(Industry Standard Architecture), the bus that connected all the components in the PC, such as
the hard disk, the graphics chips and the CPUs, played the role of design rule through being
visible to and interrelating with all those components. However, the design rule again became
obsolete, especially because the slow speed of the ISA became a bottleneck in the PC
architecture. A new design rule to replace ISA was suggested by both IBM (Micro Channel
Architecture, or MCA) and Compaq (Extended ISA); this battle over the bus leadership caused a
big confusion in the PC industry78 because the leaders weren't there79. In the late 1980s, IBM
clearly lost further value-added because its bargaining power against the suppliers became
smaller.
Incumbent assemblers thus lose the value-added when they lost the control of the
design rule. This situation also took place in the LCD TV set industry, as discussed in chapter 3.
77 Albert Y. Yu (1998)
78 Albert Y. Yu (1998); Robert A. Burgelman (2002)
79 This expression is from A. Gawer and M. A. Cusumano (2002)
75 | P a g e
4.4 Stage 4: Component Supplier Strategically Takes, Re-
organizes and Reinforces the Design Rule
The final stage of the value-shift is induced by the suppliers' strategic move to take over
industry leadership. When a supplier takes over the design rule that was originally owned by an
incumbent assembler, the supplier has more bargaining power over the assembler, and finally
the value of the assemblers is completely squeezed. Note the value-shift in the TV industry
included only from stage 1 to stage 3. Stage 4 is discussed here for the first time.
One notable example of this stage is Intel's development of the PCI bus in the PC
architecture. As introduced in section 4.3, IBM owned the design rule of the PC industry (ISA
bus and 1/O bus) in the early 1980s but failed to maintain its quality up to date in the late 1980s.
ISA was very slow and limited the performance of the other components in the PC; ISA had
reached the technological plateau and had to be replaced. Intel was very frustrated by this
speed8"; even though Intel introduced faster microprocessors, the overall speed of the PC did
not increase due to this slow bus. Moreover, an 1/O (input/output) bus that determined the
speed at which data arrived at and exited the microprocessors also killed the processing speed
of the microprocessors81 . In 1991, Intel established the new laboratory called the Intel
Architecture Lab (IAL), developed the Peripheral component Interconnect (PCI), and drove the
industry to replace ISA and adopt this new bus82 . With this Intel's strategic move, PCI became
the global design rule of the entire PC architecture because now it was the PCI bus that was
visible to and interconnected to the all the components of the PCs. In other words, Intel moved
up the value chain upstream and took over the architectural module (design rule module),
becoming the industry leader that determined the all the interfaces and relations among other
80 Robert A. Burgelman (2002)
8 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002)
8 Robert A. Burgelman (2002)
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components (Figure 4.6). Note that Microsoft took part of the design rule to control the part of
the PC architecture.
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Figure 4.7: Intel's Strategic Move to PCI and USB Bus to Take Control of the Entire
Architecture
Under this new design rule, Intel engineers removed the interrelations between Intel
processors and the other components so that future versions of the microprocessors would not
require a redesign of anything else in the PC architecture8 3, and allowed Intel to accelerate the
further evolution of processors no matter how slow the rest of the industry developed the
components. In other words, Intel made the design rule more obvious and hid the processors'
information, and decoupled Intel's zone of innovation from the rest of the computer".
Creating effective design rule at the architecture level is one of the success factors that
Intel adopted; in addition, there were other business strategies that Intel employed to drive the
whole industry to adopt a new design rule. The following four strategies were critical in Intel's
becoming the industry leader.
83 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002)
8 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002)
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1) Demonstrate strong commitment to the new design rule: To convince IBM,
Compaq and other OEMs to adopt PCI, Intel had to demonstrate its strong
commitment by making a large investment in the mass production of PCI chip sets
and renaming the company division "PCI component division"s
2) Gain strong customers' pull through "Intel Inside" marketing campaign: Intel
increased its customers' recognition and reputation and made customers select PCs
based on the performance of microprocessors. By doing this, Intel could increase
bargaining power against other players and make them adopt the new design rule.
3) Build some peripheral components that support the new design rule: In 1993, Intel
created a motherboard that had a chip, a bus, and a chip sets so that other suppliers
and complementary suppliers could easily see what they had to do.
4) Create and support new complementary suppliers in the ecosystem: Intel
developed a set of programmable instructions to make it easier for complementary
suppliers to adopt the PCI hub. Intel also developed tools for smaller PC makers to
make it easier for them easier to produce higher quality PCs at a lower cost and
compete against IBM and Compaq.
Clearly, not only a product architecture strategy but also a business strategy such as
gaining more bargaining power is important for suppliers to take over the industry leadership.
After a supplier takes the control over the design rule, incumbent assemblers usually lose most
of their value-added and it becomes very difficult to maintain previous organizational structure.
Therefore, most PC makers withdraw from the assembly and outsourced it to Taiwanese or
Chinese assemblers with low-cost labor, utilizing the brand value that they developed.
8s Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002)
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In the next section, I propose what strategies for both parties: strategies that incumbent
assembly firms can use to defy value-shift and that supplier firms can adopt to take more value-
added.
4.5 Possible Strategies for Incumbent Firms
In this section, I discuss generalized strategies for incumbent firms to defy value-shift
and how they can evaluate the strategy according to the industry situation. As discussed in
detail for the TV industry in chapter 3, there are four generalized strategic measurements that
incumbent assembler firms can use to defy value-shift and one last resort survival strategy.
4.5.1 Strategy 1: Decelerating too much modularization works in some
industry
As discussed in section 4.1, modularization is often inevitable because it gives positive
value to a firm by allowing the firm to choose the best combination of modules and by
increasing the value of a product with less investment. It is also beneficial for the whole
industry because it increase the innovation ratio. Therefore, decelerating the speed of
modularization is not the best strategic option for most incumbent firms. In fact, accelerating
modularization is more beneficial for firms in most cases.
However, as discussed in section 4.1, in some complex assembly industries such as the
automobile and aerospace industries, too much modularization lead significant cost increase of
integrating modules and risks of quality problems, thereby cancelling its benefit. In this case,
maintaining a certain level of integration between modules and controlling all the interrelations
among modules is not only beneficial for incumbent assembly firms in terms of increasing
quality, lowering costs and accelerating delivery. (See section 3.5 for Toyota's strategy) Defying
a possible value-shift is a sub product of this strategy.
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4.5.2 Strategy 2: Disperse the value of the product to several components
The main purpose of this strategy is avoiding the centralization of the product values in
the supplier firms' component. By dispersing the source of overall performance improvement
to several other components that the incumbent assembly firms control, they can lower the
relative value of the supplier firms' bottleneck components. In other words, this creates new
bottleneck in the system that is controllable by the assembly firms.
The four modular operators discussed in section 4.2 are useful in creating new
bottleneck modules. By substituting the old and saturated module with a bottleneck module or
by augmenting (adding) a new bottleneck module to the system and continuously developing
the performance of the modules, the incumbent firms can disperse the value of the products to
those new bottlenecks. Inverting the architectural module not only works to create new
bottlenecks but also intensifies the incumbent firm's control over some suppliers related to the
module. Porting modules from other products is suitable for incumbent firms that have several
different product businesses. The examples in section 4.2 will be helpful in building realistic
actions for incumbent assembly firms.
4.5.3 Strategy 3: Re-build the Design Rule that control the entire
architecture
To rebuild the design rule of the product and recover control over the value chain,
incumbent firms have to create a new design rule module by setting new and more efficient
standards that will bring more values to other players in the industry. The firms need to acquire
architectural knowledge and expertise in each component to build such efficient design rule
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acceptable for other firms". Investment in R&D should focus on creating an efficient design
rule rather than developing each component technology.
Then incumbent firms should diffuse the new design rule throughout the industry. To
drive other assemblers, suppliers and complementary provider to use the design rule, the firm
can utilize Intel's strategic actions described in section 4.4.
* Demonstrate strong commitment to the new design rule: Because no one knows
whether a new design rule will become the industry standard, other firms generally
hesitate to invest in such a design rule. Therefore, incumbent firms should show a
strong commitment to use the standard in order to gain their buy-ins.
* Gain a strong customer pull: If incumbent firms already have the strong customer
demand for a product, suppliers and complementary providers can follow the standard
without worrying.
" Create an ecosystem of new complementary suppliers and support them: Increasing
the number of small players that can profit from a new design rule is also useful in
convincing other me-too players to follow the new design rule.
* Build peripheral components to support new design rule to support other players:
Enabling target firms to follow the design rule by building their skills and providing
support tools to lower their cost of transition is also a key in persuading them to follow
the design rule.
By taking these actions, incumbent firms can create an effective ecosystem around their
new design rule and regain control over the industry.
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4.5.4 Strategy 4: Maintain or Reenter the components with the biggest
value
If the incumbent assembly firm can maintain the key bottleneck component in-house,
obviously it should do so. However, when the value shifts to the components that supplier firms
own, the incumbent assembly firm has to take a bold move to acquire the component
knowledge through cross-licensing, collaborative product developing, creation of joint venture
or M&A. The level of the knowledge that the firm can acquire is smallest in cross-licensing and
largest in M&A because, in the latter case, the firm can acquire the tacit knowledge that is not
licensed nor clearly defined but embodied within the organization.
Toyota's acquisition of hybrid car battery technology discussed in section 3.5.4 is a good
example of how an incumbent assembler can acquire knowledge through joint venture.
However, the risk of entering into joint venture with supplier firms that have only component
knowledge is the tacit or undefined knowledge of the incumbent firm can shift to the supplier
firm. The firm has to undertake careful knowledge management when it forms joint venture.
4.5.5 Strategy 5: Take thin operation
For an incumbent assembly firm that has lost both the bottleneck components and the
design rule of the entire product architecture, continuing assembly operations with a high level
of overhead is just costly because the value-added the firm can take is now very small.
Motorola case described in section 1.2.3 is an example that the firm failed because of this.
The last resort for this firm is to withdraw from the assembly operations and to shift
most of the corporate resources to a new business. IBM took this approach in the PC industry; it
sold its PC production to a Chinese PC assembler, Lenovo, in 2005 but it kept trademark
licensing for 5 years. Philips is also taking a similar approach in the TV set industry; it has
outsourced more than 70% of its TV productions to outside vendors but has kept the Philips
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brand name on its TVs. This strategy is the last resort for the firms and it often requires large
scale lay-off of engineers; however, the firm at least can avoid losing money from the large
overhead cost, despite losing value-added in the industry.
4.6 Possible strategies for supplier firms
From the supplier firms' perspective, modularization of product architecture, division of
the value chain, and shifting of value to bottleneck components are opportunities to take over
industry leadership from incumbent assembly firms. The following three strategies are the key
for supplier firms.
4.6.1 Enter the bottleneck components in the early stage
To gain the design rule of a product in the later phase, it is important for supplier firms
to own the key bottleneck component. The supplier firms have to find the next generation
bottleneck technology long before the dominant design87 is determined, and possess a
significant level of knowledge about the bottleneck components; whether through in-house
development or M&A. Baldwin88 suggested that owning the architectural knowledge, the
knowledge of the entire product architecture, is important in finding the bottleneck part. Other
strategies that supplier firms can take to gain next-generation technology dominance are
discussed in detail in Suarez (2004)89 and Suarez and Lanzolla (2007)90.
James M. Utterback (1994)
Carliss Y. Baldwin (2000)
89 Fernando F. Suarez (2004)
90 Fernando F. Suarez and Gianvito Lanzolla (2007)
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4.6.2 Take over the design-rule of the product from the incumbent
assembly firms
Utilizing the detailed knowledge of the bottleneck components, the supplier firms have
to create a new design rule module and diffuse it as the industry standard. This strategy is
essentially the same as the incumbent firms' strategy to re-build a design rule, discussed in
section 4.5.3.
4.6.3 Continue developing the design-rule to keep control
Finally, maintaining the latest design rule to fit the current structure of the industry and
to match the key players' needs is very important for keeping control over the value chain.
Otherwise, supplier firms will face the same fate as the incumbent company: losing design rule.
4.7 Conclusion
In this section, I have discussed the generalized but detailed mechanism of value-shift in
four stages using Baldwin and Clark's modularity theory and the idea of a design rule. The four
stages: 1) the product architecture is modularized and the value chain is further divided; 2) the
source of value is centralized only in the bottleneck components and the incumbent assembly
firms lose access to the components; 3) the incumbent firms gradually lose the design rule and
control over the industry; 4) the value of the incumbent firms is much more squeezed when
supplier firms take over the design rule and start controlling the whole industry.
Then I suggested strategic options that incumbent firms can take. Modularization of a
product is often inevitable for incumbent assembly firms wanting to make use of the best
technologies and increase product value with less investment; however, there are several other
strategies for defying value-shift depending on which stage the current industry occupies. On
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the other hand, for supplier firms, the value-shift is the opportunity to take over industry
leadership from incumbent assembly firms.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion - Impact of the
Thesis and Next step
In this thesis, I have offered a new perspective on the industry dynamics named value-
shift and investigated its detailed mechanism through an analysis of the TV set industry
supplemented by several examples from other industries. As a conclusion, I extract the key
impact of this work and discuss the possible future applications of the theory.
5.1 Impact of the Thesis
In Chapter 1, I reviewed major studies done by business scholars in an attempt to
answer the question of why incumbent firms lose their leadership. I argued that not many
studies have looked closely at specific case that incumbent firms' value is taken over by supplier
firms. Below I delineate other key impacts that this thesis may bring to the business strategy
research and on the industry.
1) Extract instances of the phenomenon as observed in many different assembly
industries and synthesize them as a new concept called Value-Shift: Many people have
discussed intuitively that the phenomenon of incumbent assembly firms losing their
power and supplier firms taking over leadership; however, there was no theory
connecting this phenomenon across different industries and no single term to describe
this phenomenon. This thesis extracts instances of the phenomenon seen in various
industries and synthesizes them into the concept of value-shift. Creating a term for the
concept increases people's awareness of it and makes it easier to collect more industry
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data points to verify.
2) Show how to calculate the impact of value-shift in number which people recognize
intuitively and calculate the impact using one industry example: This thesis also
intends to show thefact that value-shift is occurring in some industries, using real
numbers. This calculation also urges people to go beyond intuitive discussions of value-
shift and engage in fact-based discussions.
3) Propose the mechanism of the value-shift in four stages: This thesis shows that value-
shift does not occur at only one time; value-shift actually evolves when incumbent firms
make the wrong strategic decisions (including doing nothing) or supplier firms take
aggressive actions to take over leadership. Showing the mechanism of value-shift is very
important to understand the phenomenon and to nail down the real problems that
firms face.
4) Show that incumbent assemblers lose value not because of modularization alone but
because of the poor strategic decision-making : When I was working as a consultant in
McKinsey, I heard many business consultants and business leaders from the incumbent
firms argue incumbent firms are losing values due to modularization. However, as
shown in the thesis, modularization will give positive value for both of the incumbent
firms and the industry if the firms utilize it correctly. Also, the thesis showed there are
two or more decision making points for incumbent firms may be able to regain their
values.
5) Connect organically the independent ideas of several famous studies from the 1990s
and 2000s: By establishing the value-shift concept, I connect several scholars' works
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that have not previously been connected, namely Cusumano91's Platform Leadership,
Baldwin and Clark 92's Design Rule, Baldwin 93's Bottleneck Components, and Henderson
and Clark 94's Architectural Innovation and Modular Innovation.
6) Provide a new tool to forecast the industry's future and possible actions that firms can
take: the mechanism of value-shift in four stages and the set of strategic options will
serve as a new tool to investigate other industries and to forecast the future of those
industries. It also offers clues for firms involved in those changing industries. I show
possible areas of application in the next section.
5.2 Possible Application Area
In my future work, I will continue doing research on the TV industry, where some of my
hypotheses are not yet fully verified with supporting facts. In addition to this, I propose some
other industry areas that I apply the mechanism of value-shift to forecast the future of these
industries and discuss what actions the firms involved should take. Along with the application
to other industries, I also can revise and expand my theory to make it applicable to industries in
general.
5.2.1 Hybrid Car and Electric Vehicles Industry
The automotive industry is currently facing two major technological transitions: from
the gasoline-powered cars to hybrid cars and to electric vehicles (EV). In the transition to hybrid
cars, although the overall architecture of the car has not experienced major changes, the
91 Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002); Michael A. Cusumano (2010)
92 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (1997); Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000)
93 Carliss Y. Baldwin (2010)
94 Rebecca Henderson and Kim B. Clark (1990)
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electrical components, such as battery and electric inverters, are becoming more powerful
within the entire architecture. I assume this transition will be consistent with the value-shift
mechanism.
In the transition to EVs, the dominant design of EVs is not determined yet, so it is
difficult to say whether the transition will require large architectural changes or whether the
transition is more modular in nature and will not require major architectural change. The
former type of transition is suggested by university researchers and some EV venture firms in
the US; the latter transition is suggested by venture firms dealing with electric components and
incumbent OEM firms. I intend to formulate two scenarios to forecast the transition of the
industry and apply the value-shift mechanism to the latter scenario.
5.2.2 Mobile Handset industry
The mobile handset industry is also facing major changes. The bottleneck component of
this industry is now clearly the OS and the application software; two business strategies, the
horizontal and open strategy and the vertical and closed strategy, are crashing in the same
industry. Google represents the former strategy, developing an open source OS called Android.
Microsoft is also shifting its strategy to this side by releasing Windows Azure. These two firms
are trying to gain only bottleneck components horizontally. On the other hand, Apple opts for
more vertical and closed strategy by building their proprietary software and the ecosystem of
its application software that work only with Apple products. Therefore, the industry change is
not that simple as in the TV industry - it is not always the case that value shifts from incumbent
assemblers to suppliers. As a result, I have to make some changes to the proposed value-shit
mechanism. However, for some incumbent handset assemblers, such as Sony Ericsson, that are
shifting from in-house OS development to using Android, I can apply the value-shift mechanism
for those firms to maintain their power over the industry.
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5.2.3 Non-Assembly industries, such as e-book readers
I also suggest applying the theory in a non-assembly industry that has a clear value chain.
For example, the publishing industry is now facing the major transition to e-book readers;
publishers, the original orchestrators of the a book's value chain, are losing their value, which is
being taken over by e-book readers devices and market places such as Amazon. There is no
architecture as within the assembly products, but by mapping the activities and tasks of the
industry, I believe I can expand the value-shift mechanism to non-assembly industries.
90 1 P a g e
This page is intentionally left blank
91 1 P a g e
Bibliography
Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002), "Platform Leadership" Harvard Business
School Press
Arnold C. Cooper and Clayton G. Smith (1992), "How Established Firms Respond to Threatening
Technologies", Academy of Management Executive, 1992 Vol. 6, No.2
Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (1997), "Managing in an Age of Modularity", Harvard
Business Review, Sep-Oct, 1997
Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark (2000), "Design Rule" MIT Press
Carliss Y. Baldwin (2010), "The Strategic Use of Architectural Knowledge by Entrepreneurial
Firms", Feb 2010, HBS Working paper.
Clayton M. Christensen and Richard S. Rosenbloom (1995), "Explaining the Attacker's
Advantage: Technological Paradigms, Organizational Dynamics, and the Value Network",
Research Policy 24, 1995, pp233-257
Clayton M. Christensen (1997), "Innovator's Dilemma" Collins Business Essentials
Fernando F. Suarez (2004), "Battles for Technological Dominance: an Integrative Framework",
Research Policy 33, pp.271-289
Fernando F. Suarez and Gianvito Lanzolla (2007), "The Role of Environmental Dynamics in
Bulding a First Mover Advantage Theory", Academy of Management Review 32, No. 2, pp.377-
392
James M. Utterback (1994), "Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation" HBS Press
Jeffrey L. Funk (2009), "The emerging value network in the mobile phone industry: The case of
Japan and its implications for the rest of the world", Telecommunications Policy 33 pp.4-18
Jianxi Luo, Daniel E. Whitney, Carliss Y. Baldwin, and Christopher L. Magee (2009), "Measuring
and Understanding Hierarchy as an Architectural Element in Industry Sectors", HBS Working
Paper 09-144
Johann P. Murmann and Koen Frenken (2006), "Toward a systematic framework for research on
dominant designs, technological innovations, and industrial change", Research Policy 35,
pp.925-952
Kim B. Clark and Takahiro Fujimoto (1991), "Product Development Performance", Harvard
Business School Press
92 | P a g e
McKinsey & Company (2006), "RACE 2015 - Refueling Automotive Companies' Economics"
Michael A. Cusumano (2010),"Staying Power" [Chapter 1 and 2] from the author
Michael E. Porter (1985), "Technology and Competitive Advantage", Journal of Business Strategy,
Winter 1985, Issue 5, pp.60-78
Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson (1986), "Technological Discontinuities and
Organizational Environments", Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 1986: pp.439-465
Peter L. Grant (2000); "Outsourced Knowledge: Knowledge Transfer and Strategic Implications
from Design Outsourcing" MIT MS Thesis
Rebecca M. Henderson and Kim B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration
of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science
Quarterly, 35, 1990, pp.9-30
Orit Gadiesh and James L. Gilbert (1998), "Profit Pools -A Fresh Look at Industry", Harvard
Business Review, May-June 1998
Richard N. Foster (1986), "Innovation - The Attacker's Advantage", Summit Books]
Ron Sanchez and Joseph T. Mahoney (1996), "Modularity. Flexibility, and Knowledge
Management in Product and Organization Design", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17
(1996 winter), 63-76
Sendil K. Ethiraj (2007), "Allocation of Inventive Effort in Complex Product Systems", Strategic
Management Journal, 26(6): pp563-584
Takahiro Fujimoto (1999), "The Evolution of a Manufacturing System at Toyota", Oxford
University Press
Takahiro Fuji moto (2001), "The Japanese automobile parts supplier system: the triplet of
effective inter-firm routines", International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management,
1 (1), March 2001, pp.1-34
Takahiro Fujimoto (2002), "Japanese Style Supplier Systems and Modularization - Examples from
Automotive Industry" (Japanese) - "Modularity" Chapter 6, Masahiko Aoki and Haruhiko Ando,
Toyo-Keizai-Shimpo Press
William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback (1978), "Patterns of Industrial Innovation",
Technology Review, June-July 1978; 40-47
93 1 P a g e
Industry cases and data: TV set industry
US International Trade Commotion "Industry and Trade Summary - Television Picture Tubes and
Other Cathode Ray Tubes" Working Paper
(1993) http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working papers/pub2877.pdf
Display Search (2008): May 2008 Report "FPD TV Cost
Analysis": http://www.displaysearch.com/files/2008 May FPD TV Cost Analysis.pdf
Display Search (2005): "Large Area TFTLCD Backlight Market
Outlook" http://www.displaysearch.com/cps/rde/xbcr/displaysearch/david hsieh blu article.p
df
DWS Display (2009): LCD Components http://dwsit.egloos.com/5282006
Erik Arnold "Competition & Technological Change in the Television Industry', (1985) The
MacMillan Press Ltd.
Michael Holzmann (2008): "LCD-TV and Semiconductor" VDM
Industry cases and data: Mobile handset industry
Nabil Al-Najjar and David Besanko (2004), "Motorola in The Wireless Handset Market" Kellogg
case study KELO23
Fernando Suarez, Benjamin Edelman, and Arati Srinivasan (2009), "Symbian, Google & Apple in
the Mobile Space (A)", April 13, 2009, HBS case study 9-909-055
Industry cases and data: PC industry - Intel Case
Albert Y. Yu (1998), "Creating the Digital Future: The secrets of Consistent Innovation at Intel",
Free Press
Annabelle Gawer and Michael A. Cusumano (2002), "Platform Leadership" Harvard Business
School Press
Robert A. Burgelman (2002), "Strategy Is Destiny', Free Press
94 | P a g e
This page is intentionally left blank
95 | P a g e
